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THE  PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE of this paper is to increase our understanding 
of the role of monetary policy  in postwar U. S. business cycles.  We take 
as our starting point two common findings in the recent monetary policy 
literature based  on  vector  autoregressions  (VARs).'  First,  identified 
shocks to monetary policy  explain relatively  little of the overall varia- 
tion  in output (typically,  less  than 20  percent).  Second,  most  of  the 
observed  movement  in the instruments of monetary policy,  such as the 
federal  funds  rate or  nonborrowed  reserves,  is  endogenous;  that is, 
changes  in Federal Reserve  policy  are largely explained  by macroeco- 
nomic conditions,  as one might expect,  given the Fed's commitment to 
macroeconomic  stabilization.  These two findings obviously  do not sup- 
port the view  that erratic and unpredictable fluctuations in Federal Re- 
serve policies  are a primary cause of postwar U.S.  business cycles;  but 
neither do they rule out the possibility  that systematic  and predictable 
monetary  policies-the  Fed's  policy  rule-affect  the  course  of  the 
economy  in an important way.  Put more positively,  if  one  takes  the 
VAR evidence  on monetary policy  seriously  (as we do),  then any case 
for an important role of monetary policy  in the business  cycle  rests on 
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the argument that the choice  of the monetary policy  rule (the "reaction 
function")  has significant  macroeconomic  effects. 
Using time-series  evidence  to uncover the effects  of monetary policy 
rules on the economy  is,  however,  a daunting task. It is not possible  to 
infer the effects  of  changes  in policy  rules from a standard identified 
VAR  system,  since  this approach typically  provides  little or no struc- 
tural interpretation of the coefficients  that make up the lag structure of 
the model.  Large-scale  econometric  models,  such as the MIT-Penn- 
SSRC model,  are designed  for analyzing  alternative policies;  but criti- 
cisms  of  the  identifying  assumptions  of  these  models  have  been  the 
subject of a number of important papers, notably,  by Robert Lucas and 
Christopher Sims.2  Particularly relevant to the present paper is Sims's 
point that the many overidentifying  restrictions  of  large-scale  models 
may be both theoretically  and empirically suspect,  often implying spec- 
ifications  that do not match the basic time-series  properties of the data 
particularly well.  Recent progress in the development  of dynamic sto- 
chastic general equilibrium models  overcomes  much of Lucas's  objec- 
tion to the traditional approach, but the ability of these models to fit the 
time-series  data-in  particular, the relationships among money,  interest 
rates,  output,  and prices-seems,  if anything,  worse  than that of tra- 
ditional  large-scale  models. 
In this paper we take some modest (but, we hope,  informative)  first 
steps  toward sorting out the effects  of  systematic  monetary policy  on 
the economy,  within a framework designed  to accommodate  the time- 
series facts about the U.S.  economy  in a flexible  manner. Our strategy 
involves  adding a little  bit of  structure to an identified VAR.  Specifi- 
cally,  we assume that monetary policy works its effects on the economy 
through the medium of the term structure of open-market interest rates; 
and that, given  the term structure, the policy  instrument (in our appli- 
cation,  the federal funds rate) has no independent effect  on the econ- 
omy.  In combination with the expectations  theory of the term structure, 
this assumption  allows  one to summarize the effects  of alternative ex- 
pected future monetary policies  in terms of their effects  on the current 
short  and  long  interest  rates,  which,  in  turn,  help  to  determine  the 
evolution  of the economy.  By  comparing,  for example,  the historical 
behavior of the economy  with its behavior under an hypothesized  alter- 
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native policy  reaction function,  we obtain a rough measure of the im- 
portance of the systematic component of monetary policy.  Our approach 
is similar in spirit to a methodology  due to Sims and Tao Zha; however, 
these  authors do not attempt to sort out the effects  of  anticipated and 
partially unanticipated  policy  changes.3  While  our proposed  method- 
ology  is crude,  and certainly is not invulnerable to the Lucas critique, 
we believe  that it represents a commonsense  approach to the problem 
of measuring the effects  of anticipated policy,  given currently available 
tools. 
To  be  able  to  compare  historical  and alternative  hypothesized  re- 
sponses  of  monetary  policy  to  economic  disturbances,  one  needs  to 
select  some interesting set of macroeconomic  shocks to which policy  is 
likely  to  respond.  We  focus  primarily  on  oil  price  shocks,  for  two 
reasons.4  First,  periods  dominated  by oil  price shocks  are reasonably 
easy to identify empirically,  and the case for exogeneity  of at least the 
major oil  price  shocks  is  strong  (although,  there  is  also  substantial 
controversy  about how these shocks  and their economic  effects  should 
be modeled).  Second,  in the view of many economists,  oil price shocks 
are perhaps the leading alternative to monetary policy  as the key factor 
in postwar U.S.  recessions:  increases  in oil prices preceded the reces- 
sions  of  1973-75,  1980-82,  and  1990-91,  and James Hamilton  pre- 
sents evidence  that increases  in oil prices led declines  in output before 
1972  as well.5  Further, one  of  the strongest  criticisms  of  the neomo- 
netarist claim that monetary policy  has been a major cause of economic 
downturns is that it may confound  the effects  of  monetary tightening 
and previous  increases  in oil prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We first document that 
essentially  all  the U.S.  recessions  of  the past thirty years  have  been 
preceded by both oil price increases  and a tightening of monetary pol- 
icy,  which  raises  the  question  to  what  extent  the  ensuing  economic 
declines  can be attributed to each factor.  Discussion  of this identifica- 
tion problem requires a digression into the parallel VAR-based literature 
3.  Sims and Zha (1995). 
4.  Hooker (1996a) also studies the effects of oil price shocks and their interaction 
with monetary  policy in a VAR framework.  However, he does not explicitly attempt  to 
decompose the effect of oil price shocks on the economy into a part  due to the change 
in oil prices and a part  due to the policy reaction. 
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on  the  effects  of  oil  price  shocks;  one  main  conclusion  is  that it  is 
surprisingly  difficult  to find an indicator of  oil  price shocks  that pro- 
duces  the expected  responses  of  macroeconomic  and policy  variables 
in a VAR setting.  After comparing alternative indicators,  we choose  as 
our principal measure of oil price shocks  the "net  oil price increase" 
variable proposed by Hamilton.6 
We next introduce our identification strategy, which summarizes the 
effects  of  an  anticipated  change  in  monetary  policy  in  terms  of  its 
impact on the current term structure of  interest rates (specifically,  the 
three-month  and ten-year  government  rates).  We  show  that this  ap- 
proach provides  reasonable results for the analysis  of shocks to mone- 
tary policy  and to oil prices; and, in particular, we find that the endog- 
enous  monetary  policy  response  can  account  for  a  very  substantial 
portion (in some cases,  nearly all) of the depressing effects  of oil price 
shocks  on the real economy.  This result is reinforced  by a more dis- 
aggregated  analysis,  which compares the effects  of oil price and mon- 
etary policy  shocks on components  of GDP. Looking more specifically 
at individual recessionary episodes  associated with oil price shocks,  we 
find that both monetary policy and other nonmoney,  nonoil disturbances 
played  important roles,  but that oil  shocks,  per se,  were not a major 
cause  of  these  downturns.  Overall,  these  findings  help to resolve  the 
long-standing  puzzle  of  the  apparently disproportionate  effect  of  oil 
price increases on the economy.  We also show that our method produces 
reasonable  results  when  applied  to  the  analysis  of  monetary  policy 
reactions  to  other  types  of  shocks,  such  as  shocks  to  output  and to 
commodity  prices. 
After  presenting  the basic  results,  we  look  in more detail  at their 
robustness  and stability.  Regarding robustness,  we find that the broad 
conclusion  that endogenous  monetary policy  is an important component 
of  the aggregate  impact of  oil  price  shocks  holds  across  a variety  of 
specifications,  although the exact proportion of the effect  due to mon- 
etary policy  is sometimes  hard to determine statistically.  We also find 
evidence  of  subsample  instability  in our estimated  system.  To  some 
extent,  however,  this instability  helps  to strengthen our main conclu- 
sions  about the role of  endogenous  monetary policy,  in that the total 
effect  of  oil  price  shocks  on  the  economy  on  output is  found  to  be 
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strongest during the Volcker era-when  the monetary  response to in- 
flationary  shocks was also the strongest. 
Our analysis uses interpolated  monthly data on GDP and its com- 
ponents. Appendix A documents the construction  of these data, and 
appendix  B describes all of the data that we use. 
Is It Monetary Policy or Is It Oil? The Basic Identification 
Problem 
The idea that monetary  policy is a major  source of real fluctuations 
in the economy is an old one; much of its lasting appeal reflects the 
ongoing influence of the seminal work of Milton Friedman  and Anna 
Schwartz.7  Obtaining  credible  measurements  of monetary  policy's con- 
tribution  to business cycles has proved  difficult, however. As discussed 
above, in recent years numerous  authors  have addressed  the measure- 
ment of the effects of monetary  policy by means of the VAR method- 
ology,  introduced  into economics by Sims.8 Roughly speaking, this 
approach  identifies unanticipated  innovations  to monetary  policy with 
an unforecasted shock to some policy indicator, such as the federal 
funds rate or the rate of growth of nonborrowed  reserves. Using the 
estimated VAR system, one can trace out the dynamic responses of 
output, prices, and other macroeconomic  variables  to this innovation, 
thereby  obtaining  quantitative  estimates  of how monetary  policy inno- 
vations affect the economy. As John Cochrane  notes, "this literature 
has at last produced  impulse-response  functions that capture  common 
views about monetery  policy"; for example, in finding that a positive 
innovation  to monetary  policy is followed by increases  in output,  prices, 
and money, and by a decline in the short-term  nominal interest rate.9 
In addition, despite ongoing debates about precisely how the policy 
innovation should be identified, the estimated responses of key mac- 
roeconomic  variables  to a policy shock are reasonably  similar  across a 
7.  Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963). 
8.  Sims (1980); more recently, see Bernanke  and Blinder (1992), Christiano  and 
Eichenbaum  (1992), Sims (1992), Strongin  (1995), Bernanke  and Mihov (1995), Sims 
and  Zha (1995), and Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996). 
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variety of studies and suggest that monetary  policy shocks can have 
significant  and persistent  real effects. 
The VAR literature  has focused on unanticipated  policy shocks not 
because  they are  quantitatively  very important-indeed, the conclusion 
of this literature  is that  policy shocks are too small to account  for much 
of the overall variation  in output  and other  variables-but  because it is 
argued that cause and effect can be cleanly disentangled  only in the 
case of exogenous, or random, changes in policy. However, looking 
only at unanticipated  policy changes begs the question  of how system- 
atic, or endogenous, monetary  policy changes affect the economy. '? 
Earlier  work on the effects of monetary  policy often does not make 
the distinction  between anticipated  and  unanticipated  policy changes.  "  I 
These studies frequently  find a very large role for monetary  policy in 
cyclical fluctuations.  An important  recent example of this genre is an 
article  by Christina  Romer  and  David Romer.  12 Following the narrative 
approach  of Friedman  and Schwartz, Romer and Romer use Federal 
Reserve records to identify a series of dates at which, in response to 
high inflation, the Fed changed policy in a sharply  contractionary  di- 
rection. Their  dates  presumably  correspond  to policy changes  with both 
an unanticipated  component  (because they were large, or decisive) and 
an anticipated  component  (because they were explicit responses to in- 
flation); indeed, Matthew Shapiro shows that these dates are largely 
forecastable.  '  Romer and Romer find that their dates were typically 
followed by large declines in real activity and conclude that monetary 
policy plays an important  role in fluctuations. 
But as several critiques  of Romer  and  Romer's article  and  the earlier 
work on anticipated  monetary  policy point out, studies that blur the 
10. Cochrane  (1996) has emphasized  that even identification  of the effects of un- 
anticipated  policy changes may hinge on distinguishing  between anticipated  and unan- 
ticipated changes, since an innovation  in policy typically also changes the anticipated 
future  path of policy. The analyst  thus faces the conundrum  of determining  how much 
of the economy's response  to a policy shock is due to the shock, per se, and  how much 
is due to the change in policy anticipations  engendered  by the shock. The focus of this 
paper  is different  from that of Cochrane,  in that we emphasize  the effects of nonpolicy 
shocks, such as oil shocks, on anticipated  monetary  policy; but our methods  could also 
be used to address  the specific issue he raises. 
11. Nor, for that  matter,  between  changes  in the money stock induced  by policy and 
those induced  by other  factors. See, for example, Andersen  and Jordan  (1968). 
12. Romer  and Romer  (1989). 
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distinction  between  anticipated and unanticipated policies  suffer from 
precisely  the  identification  problem  that  the  VAR  literature has  at- 
tempted to avoid; namely,  that it is not obvious  how to distinguish  the 
effects  of  anticipated policies  from the effects  of the shocks  to which 
the policies  are responding.  This is not merely methodological  carping, 
but is  potentially  of  great practical  importance  in  the  postwar  U.S. 
context,  since  a number of  the  most  significant  tightenings  of  U.S. 
monetary policy  have followed  on the heels  of  major increases  in the 
price of imported oil.  4 
This point  is illustrated in figure  1, which  shows  the historical  be- 
havior of the federal funds rate (here, taken to be an indicator of mon- 
etary policy)  in the upper panel and the log-level  of the nominal price 
of oil  in the lower panel.  Recessions,  as dated by the National Bureau 
of Economic  Research,  are shaded. The upper panel also indicates the 
five  dates  identified  by Romer and Romer that fall  within our sample 
period.  The lower panel shows,  in analogy  to the Romer dates,  seven 
dates at which there were major disruptions to the oil market, as deter- 
mined in part by Kevin Hoover  and Stephen Perez. '5 
The  upper panel  of  figure  1,  taken  alone,  appears to  support the 
neomonetarist  case that tight money is the cause of recessions:  each of 
the first four recessions  in the figure was  immediately  preceded  by  a 
sharp increase in the federal funds rate, and the 1990 recession followed 
a monetary  tightening  that ended  in  late  1989.  Peaks  in the  federal 
funds rate also  tend to coincide  with the Romer dates.  However,  the 
lower  panel  of  figure  1 shows  why  it would  be premature to  lay  the 
blame for postwar recessions  at the door of the Federal Reserve: as was 
first emphasized  by Hamilton,  nearly all of the postwar U.S.  recessions 
have also followed  increases in the nominal price of oil,  which,  in turn, 
have  been  associated  with  monetary  tightenings. 16 Further, many  of 
these oil price shocks were arguably exogenous,  reflecting a variety of 
developments  both in the Middle East and in the domestic  industry, as 
indicated  by  the Hoover-Perez  dates.  Thus  the general  identification 
problem  is  here cast  in a specific  form: what portion of  the last  five 
14. See Dotsey and Reid (1992) and Hoover  and Perez (1994). 
15. Hoover and Perez (1994), in their critique  of the Romer  and Romer  approach, 
introduce  six dates, which are, in turn, based on a chronology  due to Hamilton  (1983). 
We have added  August 1990, the month  when Iraq  invaded  Kuwait. 
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U.S.  recessions, and of aggregate  output and price fluctations  in gen- 
eral, was due to oil price shocks, per se, and what portion  was due to 
the Federal  Reserve's response  to those shocks?  To answer  this question 
requires  a means of measuring  the effects of anticipated  or systematic 
monetary  policies.'7 
Measuring  Oil Price  Shocks and their Effects 
We propose to identify the importance  of the monetary  policy feed- 
back rule in a modified  VAR framework.  In order  to do that, however, 
one needs to find an appropriate  indicator  of oil price shocks to incor- 
porate into the VAR systems. This is a more difficult task than it may 
appear  at first. The most natural  indicator  would seem to be changes in 
the nominal  oil price; and indeed, in an article which helped to initiate 
the literature  on the effects of oil price shocks, Hamilton shows that 
increases in the nominal price of oil Granger-cause  downturns  in eco- 
nomic activity.'8 However, the arrival of  new data has shown this 
simple measure  to have a rather  unstable  relationship  with macroeco- 
nomic  outcomes, leading  subsequent  researchers  to employ increasingly 
complicated specifications  of the "true" relationship  between oil and 
the economy. II  In particular,  Hamilton  argues  in his more recent work 
that the correct measure of oil shocks depends very much upon the 
precise mechanism  by which changes in the price of oil are supposed 
to affect the economy, a question for which many answers have been 
proposed  but on which there  is little agreement.20  For our  purposes, the 
exact channels through  which oil affects the economy are not crucial. 
17. In this paper,  we take as given that  anticipated  as well as unanticipated  monetary 
policies influence  the real  economy, owing to the existence  of various  nominal  rigidities. 
Our objective is to provide  an estimate  of the real impact  of the systematic  component 
of monetary  policy, as opposed to testing the null hypothesis that this component  is 
neutral. 
18. Hamilton  (1983), to the surprise  of many, also demonstrates  that there appears 
to have been a close relationship  between  oil price increases  and recessions  even before 
the major  OPEC  shocks of the 1970s. 
19. See, for example, Mork  (1989), Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995), Hamilton  (1996a), 
and Hooker  (1996a, 1996b). 
20.  Possibilities discussed by Hamilton (1996a) include aggregate supply effects 
operating  through  costs of production  and  the indirect  effects of wage rigidity;  aggregate 
demand  effects; effects arising from the interaction  of uncertainty  about  future  energy 
prices and the irreversibility  of investment;  and asymmetric  sectoral  impacts  that force 
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What matters  is that one can identify an exogenous movement in the 
price of oil that has a significant and a priori plausible reduced-form 
impact  on the economy. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of some alternative  measures  of oil 
price shocks on selected variables, as indicated  by estimated impulse 
response functions (IRFs). Each IRF is based on a five-variable  VAR 
that includes, in this order:  (1) the log of real GDP; (2) the log of the 
GDP deflator;  (3) the log of an index of spot commodity  prices; (4) an 
indicator  of the state of the oil market;  and (5) the level of the federal 
funds rate. Data are monthly; the VAR is estimated using a constant 
and seven lags,  as determined by the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC); and the sample period is 1965-95.2  Only the impulse responses 
of real GDP, the GDP deflator, and the federal funds rate are shown, 
in each case over a forty-eight-month  horizon  and  for an oil price shock 
normalized  to correspond  to a 1 percent  increase  in the current  nominal 
oil price. Dashed lines correspond  to one standard  error  bands. As is 
standard  in the VAR literature  on the effects of monetary  policy, the 
index of commodity prices is added to the VAR to control for infor- 
mation that the Fed may have about future inflation  which is not cap- 
tured by the other variables in the system.22  The federal funds rate is 
included as an indicator  of monetary  policy.23  The ordering  of the oil 
indicator after the macroeconomic  variables imposes the reasonable 
21  Appendix  A describes  the construction  of monthly  data for GDP and the GDP 
deflator.  The logarithm  of real GDP is detrended  with a cubic spline with three  equally 
spaced knot points imposing equality  of the levels and first  two derivatives  at the knot 
points. The resulting  estimated  trend  component  is essentially piecewise linear, with a 
break  in the early 1970s reflecting  the productivity  slowdown. Other  data are from the 
CITIBASE  electronic database,  available  from Citicorp  Database  Services (see appen- 
dix B). The CITIBASE  labels for the series are: FYFF (federal  funds rate), PSCCOM 
(commodity  price index), and PW561 (nominal  oil price index, Producer  Price Index 
for crude oil and products).  We focus here on full sample results;  we discuss possible 
subsample  instabilities  below. 
22.  The inclusion of the commodity  price index is suggested by Sims (1992) as a 
way of eliminating  the so-called price puzzle in monetary  policy VARs. In the present 
context, it is important  to note that, for most of its history, the commodity  price index 
appears  to have excluded  oil and  other  energy  prices  (a little uncertainty  remains  because 
of the poor documentation  of the series). Since 1987, an oil price has been included  in 
the index. As we report  below, however, there is little evidence that its inclusion has 
any substantive  effect on our results. 
23.  Results from Bernanke  and Blinder (1992), Bernanke  and Mihov (1995), and 
Friedman  and Kuttner  (1996) suggest that it is reasonable  to use the funds rate as a 
policy indicator,  except possibly during  the 1979-82 reserves-targeting  period. co 
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assumption that oil price shocks do not significantly  affect the economy 
within  the month.  Similarly,  ordering the funds  rate last follows  the 
conventional  assumption  that monetary policy  operates with at least a 
one-month  lag.  The results are not sensitive  to these ordering assump- 
tions,  as we document below  in the context  of a larger system. 
In figure 2  we  report results  for four  alternative  indicators  of  the 
state of the oil market; one is a slight variation of the original Hamilton 
indicator,  the  other  three  are more  exotic  indicators  that have  been 
developed  in ongoing  attempts to identify a stable relationship between 
oil price shocks  and the economy: 
-Log  of the nominal  Producer Price Index (PPI) for crude oil  and 
products; the nominal  oil  price,  for short. Hamilton employs  the log- 
difference  of the nominal oil price, which,  given the presence of freely 
estimated  lag parameters,  is nearly equivalent  to using  the log-level. 
Given  the other variables  included  in the VAR,  this  indicator is  also 
essentially  the  same  as  that used  by  Julio  Rotemberg  and  Michael 
Woodford.24 
-Hoover-Perez.  These  are the oil shock dates identified by Hoover 
and Perez  plus  August  1990,  as discussed  in regard to figure  1  .25 To 
scale  these  dates by relative  importance,  for each month we  multiply 
the Hoover-Perez  dummy variables  by the log  change  in the nominal 
price of oil over the three months centered on the given  month. 
-Mork.  After the sharp oil price declines  of  1985-86  failed to lead 
to an economic  boom,  Knut Mork argued that the effects  of  positive 
and negative oil price shocks on the economy  need not be symmetric.26 
Empirically,  he  provided  evidence  that only  positive  changes  in the 
relative  price of oil  have important effects  on output. Accordingly,  in 
our VARs  we employ  an indicator that equals the log-difference  of the 
relative price of oil when that change is positive  and otherwise is zero.2 
24.  Hamilton  (1983); Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1996). 
25.  Hoover and Perez (1994). 
26.  Mork  (1989). 
27.  We measure  the relative  price  of oil as the PPI for crude  oil divided  by the GDP 
deflator.  Mork (1989) argues that the PPI for crude oil is a distorted  measure  of the 
marginal  cost of oil during  certain  periods  marked  by domestic  price controls;  he there- 
fore measures  oil prices by refiner  acquisition cost instead, for the period for which 
those data are available. We choose to stick with the crude  oil PPI for simplicity, and 
because  we feel that  there  are  also problems  with the refiner  acquisition  cost as a measure 
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Hamilton. In response to the breakdown  of the relationship  be- 
tween output and simpler measures  of oil price shocks, Hamilton  has 
proposed a more complicated measure  of oil price changes: the "net 
oil price increase.  "28 This measure  distinguishes  between oil price in- 
creases that establish new highs relative to recent experience and in- 
creases  that  simply reverse  recent  decreases. Specifically, in the context 
of monthly data, Hamilton's measure  equals the maximum  of (a) zero 
and (b) the difference between the log-level of the crude oil price for 
the current  month  and  the maximum  value of the logged crude  oil price 
achieved in the previous twelve months. Hamilton  provides some evi- 
dence  for the usefulness  of this variable,  using semiparametric  methods, 
and Hooker also finds it to perform well,  in the sense of having a 
relatively stable relationship  with macroeconomic  variables.29 
The deficiencies of the simplest  measure  of the state  of the oil market, 
the nominal  price of crude  oil, are apparent  from figure  2. In particular, 
for our 1965-95 sample period, a shock to the nominal price of oil is 
followed by a rise in output  for the first  year or so and  by a slight short- 
run decline in the price level. Both of these results (which have been 
verified in the recent literature  on oil price shocks) are anomalous, 
relative  to the conventional  wisdom about  the effects of oil price shocks 
on the economy. As indicated  in note 29, other simple measures, such 
as the relative price of oil, give similarly unsatisfactory  results. 
The three more  complex indicators  (Hoover-Perez,  Mork, and Ham- 
ilton) produce "better looking" IRFs, in that output falls and prices 
rise following an oil price shock, although  generally neither  response 
is statistically significant. The point estimates of the effect of an oil 
price shock on output  suggest a modest impact  from an economic per- 
spective. For example, in the case of the Hamilton  indicator, the sum 
28.  Hamilton  (1996a, 1996b). 
29.  Hamilton  (1996b); Hooker  (1996a). We also experimented  with VARs including 
the log-difference  of the nominal price of oil (the indicator  used by Hamilton, 1983); 
the log of the real price of oil (the nominal  oil price divided by the GDP deflator);  the 
log-difference  of the real price of oil; and the log of the nominal  price of oil weighted 
by the share  of energy  costs in GDP (as suggested  by William  Nordhaus  at the Brookings 
Panel  meeting). As the results  obtained  were very similar  to those using the log nominal 
price  of oil, we do not report  them  here. The literature  provides  yet additional  indicators 
of oil price shocks. Those proposed  by Ferderer  (1996) and Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995), 
for example, focus on the volatility of oil prices rather  than the level. For simplicity, 
we ignore these second-moment-based  measures  and concentrate  on measures  that are 
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of the impulse response coefficients  for output over the first forty-eight 
months is  -0.538,  implying  that a 1 percent (transitory) shock to oil 
prices leads to a cumulative  loss of about 0.5  percent of a month's real 
GDP,  or 0.045  percent of  a year's  real GDP,  over  four years.  As  is 
touched  on below,  more economically  and statistically  significant  ef- 
fects  of  oil  price  shocks  are estimated  (a) when  the latter part of  the 
sample, which contains the somewhat anomalous 1990 episode,  is omit- 
ted; and (b) when the VAR  system  is augmented with short-term and 
long-term market interest rates. 
Figure 2 also  shows  that for all four indicators of the oil  market, a 
positive  innovation  to oil  prices is followed  by a rise in the funds rate 
(tighter monetary policy),  as expected,  and the response  is generally 
statistically  significant.  This funds rate response illustrates the generic 
identification  problem: without  further structure, it is not possible  to 
determine how much of the decline  in output is the direct result of the 
increase in oil prices,  as opposed to the ensuing tightening of monetary 
policy. 
This brief exercise  demonstrates a main result of the recent literature 
on the macroeconomic  effects  of oil  prices,  that finding a measure of 
oil price shocks that "works"  in a VAR context is not straightforward. 
It is  also  true that the estimated  impacts of these  measures on output 
and prices  can be quite unstable over different  samples,  as discussed 
below.  For present purposes,  however,  based  on the evidence  of  the 
literature and our own  analysis  (including  figure  2),  we  choose  the 
Hamilton net oil price increase measure of oil price shocks for our basic 
analyses.30 As we discuss  further below,  we have checked  the robust- 
ness  of our exercises  to the use of alternative oil market indicators; in 
general,  we  find that when a given  oil-market indicator yields  reason- 
able results  in exercises  like  those  shown  in figure 2,  our alternative 
simulations  also perform reasonably. 
Measuring  the Effects of Endogenous  Monetary Policy 
Figure 2 shows  that, at least for some  more complex-some  might 
argue, data-mined-indicators  of oil prices,  an exogenous  increase  in 
the price of oil  has the expected  effects  on the economy:  output falls, 
30.  In particular,  Hooker  (1996a) finds  that  the Hamilton  measure  is the most stable 
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prices  rise,  and monetary policy  tightens  (presumably  in response  to 
the  inflationary  pressures  from  the  oil  shock).  Since  James  Tobin's 
Brookings  paper, however,  it has been argued that oil and energy costs 
are too small relative to total production costs to account for the entire 
decline  in output that, at least in some episodes,  has followed  increases 
in the price of oil.31  A natural hypothesis,  therefore,  is that part of the 
recessionary  impact of  oil  price  increases  arises from the subsequent 
monetary contraction. 
Sims and Zha attempt to provide rough estimates of the contribution 
of  endogenous  monetary  policy  changes  in  a  VAR  context.32 Their 
approach is to "shut  down"  the policy  response that would otherwise 
be implied  by the VAR estimates;  for example,  by setting the federal 
funds rate (the monetary policy  indicator) at its baseline level (the value 
that it would  have  taken in the  absence  of  the exogenous  nonpolicy 
shock).  The difference  between  the total effect  of the exogenous  non- 
policy  shock on the system variables and the estimated effect  when the 
policy  response  is  shut down  is  then interpreted as a measure of  the 
contribution of the endogenous  policy  response. 
As Sims and Zha correctly point out, this procedure is equivalent to 
combining  the initial  nonpolicy  shock with a series  of policy  innova- 
tions just sufficient  to off-set  the endogenous  policy  response.  Implic- 
itly,  then, in the Sims-Zha exercise,  people  in the economy  are repeat- 
edly  "surprised"  by the failure of policy  to respond to the nonpolicy 
shock in its accustomed way. The authors argue, not unreasonably,  that 
it would  take some  time for people  to learn that policy  was not going 
to respond  in its usual way;  so that, for deviations  of  policy  from its 
historical  pattern that are neither  too  large  nor too  protracted,  their 
estimates  of the policy  effects  may be acceptable approximations.  This 
justification  is  similar to the one  that Sims  uses  in earlier articles  for 
conducting  policy  analyses  in a VAR setting,  despite the issues  raised 
by the Lucas critique.33 
31.  Tobin  (1980)  .See also Darby  (1982), Kim  and  Loungani  (1992), and  Rotemberg 
and Woodford  (1996). Rotemberg  and Woodford  argue  that  a monopolistically  compet- 
itive market  structure,  which leads to changing markups  over the business cycle,  in 
principle  can explain the strong  effect of oil price shocks. 
32.  Sims and Zha (1995). Counterfactual  simulations  in a VAR context have also 
been performed  by West (1993) and Kim (1995); neither  paper  distinguishes  anticipated 
from unanticipated  movements  in policy. 
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Rather than  ignoring  Lucas's  argument  altogether,  however,  one 
might try to accommodate  it partially in the VAR context,  by acknowl- 
edging that it may be more important for some markets than for others. 
In particular, the evidence  for the relevance of the Lucas critique seems 
much stronger for financial markets-for  example,  in the determination 
of the term structure of interest rates-than  in labor and product mar- 
kets,  which  has led some  economic  forecasters  and policy  analysts to 
propose and estimate models with rational expectations  in the financial 
market only.34 In that spirit,  we  modify  the  Sims-Zha  procedure for 
measuring  the effects  of  endogenous  policy  by assuming  that interest 
rate expectations  are formed rationally (and in particular, that financial 
markets anticipate alternative policy paths), but that the other equations 
of  the VAR  system  are invariant to the contemplated  policy  change. 
The latter assumption  can be rationalized  by assuming  either that ex- 
pectations  of  monetary  policy  enter the  true structural equations  for 
output, prices,  and so forth only through the term structure of interest 
rates; or, if other policy-related  expectations  enter into those structural 
equations,  that (for policy  changes that are not too large) these respond 
more  sluggishly  than financial  market expectations,  as  proposed  by 
Sims.35 Although  our method is obviously  neither fully  structural nor 
immune to the Lucas critique,  it provides  an interesting  alternative to 
the Sims-Zha  approach. 
More specifically,  we consider small VAR systems that include stan- 
dard macroeconomic  variables,  short-term and long-term interest rates, 
and the  federal  funds  rate (as  an indicator  of  monetary policy).  We 
make the following  assumptions: 
First,  that the federal  funds rate does  not directly  affect  macro- 
economic  variables such as output and prices; a reasonable assumption, 
since  the funds rate applies to a very limited set of transactions (over- 
night borrowings  of commercial  bank reserves).  Hence  the funds rate 
is excluded  from the equations  in the system  determining those  varia- 
bles.  However,  the funds rate is allowed  to affect macroeconomic  var- 
iables indirectly,  through its effect on short-term and long-term interest 
rates,  which,  in turn, are allowed  to enter every  equation  that deter- 
34.  See Blanchard  (1984) on the comparative  relevance  of the Lucas critique. See 
Taylor (1993) for an example of a model with rational expectations limited to the 
financial  market. 
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mines  a macroeconomic  variable.  Note  that the assumption that mon- 
etary policy  works strictly through interest rates is conservative,  as it 
ignores  other  possible  channels,  such  as  the  exchange  rate  and the 
"credit channel."  In this sense,  our estimates  should represent a lower 
bound on the contribution of endogenous  monetary policy. 
-Second,  following  many  previous  authors,  that the  macroeco- 
nomic  variables  in the  system  are Wold-causally  prior to all  interest 
rates. That is, in our monthly data, we assume that interest rates respond 
to contemporaneous  developments  in the economy,  but that changes in 
interest rates do not affect "slow-moving"  variables such as output and 
prices within the month. This is a plausible assumption,  given planning 
and production lags.36 
-Third,  that the funds rate is Wold-causally  prior to the other mar- 
ket interest rates.  That is,  the covariation  between  innovations  in the 
funds  rate  and  in  other  interest  rates  is  caused  by  the  influence  of 
monetary policy  changes  on interest rates, rather than by the response 
of the policymakers  to market rates within the month. This is a strong 
assumption,  although it appears to give  fairly reasonable results in the 
context  of  the  expectations  theory  of  the  term  structure.  It may  be 
justified  if the term premium contains  no information about the econ- 
omy  that is not also contained  in the other variables  seen by the Fed. 
Below,  we  briefly discuss  an alternative ordering assumption  that al- 
lows for considerable reaction by the Fed to current market interest rate 
movements. 
Formally,  let Y, denote a set of macroeconomic  variables,  including 
the price of oil,  at date t. Similarly,  let R,  =  (Rs, RI) represent the set 
of market interest rates; specifically,  the three-month Treasury bill rate 
(the  "short  rate,"  RS) and the ten-year Treasury bond rate (the "long 
rate,"  R,). Finally,  the scalar FF, is the federal funds rate. Under the 
assumptions  above,  the restricted VAR system  is written 
p 
(1)  Yt  (I'v,Yt-i  +  FvriR,t-) +  GN'l'Et 
36.  As Sims points  out, however, the assumption  is less plausible  for the commodity 
price index, which is included in the nonpolicy block as an information  variable;  see 
Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996). Ben S. Bernanke,  Mark  Gertler, and Mark Watson  109 
p 
(2)  FF,  =  ,  a,jYt_j  +  nr,jR,t_ +  Trr0jFF,t_) 
+  Er,  +  G  +  GfE,, 




e!  +  G,E;, 
where the  rr  and G terms are matrices of coefficients  of the appropriate 
dimensions,  the  E  terms  are vectors  of  orthogonal  error terms,  and 
constant terms have been omitted for notational convenience.  For equa- 
tion  1, the exclusion  of FFt_i  follows  from the first assumption above, 
that the funds rate does  not directly  affect  macroeconomic  variables; 
and the exclusion  of Er, and E11,  is implied by the second  assumption, 
that innovations  to interest rates do not affect  the nonpolicy  variables 
within the period. 
In order to apply the expectations  theory to identify  a relationship 
between  the funds rate and the market interest rates, and to implement 
our policy  experiments,  it is useful to decompose  the market rates into 
two parts: a part reflecting expectations  of future values of the nominal 
funds rate, and a term premium.  We define the following  variables: 
tIs- I 
(4)  Rs =  E, (  O FF,+) 
i  0 
(5)  RI= 




(6)  Ss=  RS-R 
(7)  Si  RI  RI 
where ns  =  3 months and nl  =  120 months are the terms of the short- 
term and long-term rates, respectively;  the weights,  w,  are defined by 
ts-  I  ,11-  I 
(S.=  i  X  P  and w,  =  i  >  E  1;  and E is the expectations 
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operator. We set the monthly discount factor,  E  equal to 0.997,  so that 
112  is equal to 0.9637.  The R variables defined in equations 4 and 5 are 
the  "expectations  components"  of the short and long  market interest 
rates,  and the residual  S terms in equations  6 and 7 are time-varying 
term-cum-risk  premiums  associated  with  rates at the two  maturities. 
Note  that the  time  series  of  the  two  components  of  short and long 
interest rates are easily  calculated from current and lagged values of Y, 
FF,  and R,  using  the  estimated  rr parameters in  equations  1-3.  In 
particular, finding the estimated expectations  components  of short and 
long rates is purely a forecasting exercise  and does not require structural 
identifying  assumptions. 
With these definitions,  it is useful  to rewrite the model of equations 
1-3  as 
p 
(8)  Yt  [1  T7.iY,-i  +  1Tvri(R,-Ji  +  S,_)]  +  GVyE  t 
p 




+  GSES, 
p 
(10)  S, =  >  (XA,.!jYt_ +  _  srjR  +  XS,IFF,t;) 
+  Es,t  +  G,VE,,t  +  GsfEft, 
Equation 8 is identical to equation 1, except that the two market interest 
rates have  been  broken up into  their expectations  and term premium 
components.  Equations 9 and 10 correspond to equations 2 and 3, with 
the interest rates, R,  replaced by the corresponding term premiums,  S. 
Since the difference  between R and S is the expectations  component of 
interest rates, which is constructed as a projection on current and lagged 
values of observable  variables,  equation  10 are equivalent to equations 
2 and 3. In particular, the coefficients  in equations 9 and 10 are simply 
combinations  of the coefficients  in equation 3 and the projection coef- 
ficients  of the federal funds rate on current and lagged  variables. 
37.  This weighting function  and the value of I3  are suggested  by Shiller, Campbell, 
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We work with the system of equations 8-10  because it simplifies  the 
imposition  of some alternative identifying  restrictions.  Our main iden- 
tifying  assumption,  discussed  above,  is that the federal  funds rate is 
Wold-causally  prior to the other interest rates in the model; this corre- 
sponds  to  the  assumption  that G1,  =  0  in equation  9.  However,  an 
alternative  assumption,  which  allows  for two-way  causality  between 
the funds rate and market rates, is that shocks to the federal funds rate 
affect other interest rates contemporaneously  only through their impact 
on expectations  of the future funds rate (that is,  funds rate shocks  do 
not affect term premiums contemporaneously);  this corresponds to the 
restriction  that Gs,  =  0 in equation  10.  Note  that this alternative  as- 
sumption allows  the funds rate to respond to innovations  in term pre- 
miums.  In both cases,  we assume that GVV  is lower-triangular (with ornes 
on the diagonal),  as in conventional  VAR analyses employing  the Cho- 
leski  decomposition.  In most of our applications,  the "macro  block" 
consists  of  real GDP,  the GDP  deflator,  the commodity  price  index, 
and Hamilton's  net  oil  price  increase  variable,  in  that order; as  we 
show  below,  our results  are robust to the placement  of the oil  market 
indicator. 
To  illustrate  how  we  carry  out  policy  experiments,  consider  the 
scenario  of  greatest  interest  in  this  paper: a  shock  to  the  oil  price 
variable.  The base case,  which incorporates the effects  of the endoge- 
nous policy  response,  is calculated  in the conventional  way,  by simu- 
lating  the effects  of  an innovation  to the oil  price  variable using  the 
system of equations  8 to 10. Among the results of this exercise  are the 
standard impulse  response  functions,  showing  the dynamic  impact of 
an oil  price shock on the variables of the system,  including  the policy 
variables. 
To simulate the effects  of an oil price shock under a counterfactual 
policy  regime,  we first specify  an alternative path for the federal funds 
rate-more  specifically,  deviations  from the baseline impulse response 
of the funds rate-in  a manner analogous  to the approach of Sims  and 
Zha.38 However,  we assume that financial markets understand and an- 
ticipate this alternative policy  response; by assuming "maximum  cred- 
ibility"  of the Fed's  announced future policy,  we  stand in direct con- 
trast to Sims  and Zha,  who assume that market participants are purely 
38.  Sims and Zha (1995). 112  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1997 
backward-looking.  To incorporate this assumption into the simulation, 
we calculate the expectations  component of interest rates, R,+,,  i  =  0, 
1,  ...,  that is consistent  with the proposed  future path for the federal 
funds rate. We then resimulate the effects  of the oil shock in the system 
of equations  8-10,  imposing  values  of R, consistent  with the assumed 
path of  the funds  rate,  and also  choosing  values  of  E11,  such that the 
assumed future path of the funds rate is realized.  Note that this method 
can be used to construct alternative impulse  response  functions  based 
on full-sample  or subsample  estimates  and to simulate  counterfactual 
economic  behavior  for  specific  episodes,  such  as the major oil  price 
shocks.  We use it in both ways below. 
Some Policy Experiments 
With  the methodology  described  above,  we  are able to perform a 
variety of policy  experiments,  using estimates from our sample period, 
January 1965 through December  1995.  The VAR  is estimated using  a 
constant and seven  lags,  as determined by AIC. 
A Monetary Policy  Shock 
To check  on the reasonableness  of  the basic  estimated  system,  we 
begin with the conventional  analysis of a monetary policy  shock,  mod- 
eled  here as a 25 basis point innovation  to the federal funds rate. The 
effects  of  an innovation  to the federal  funds  rate are traced out in a 
seven-variable  system  that includes  output,  the price  level,  the com- 
modity price index,  the Hamilton oil  measure,  the funds rate, and the 
short and long term premiums.  Figure 3 presents the resulting impulse 
response  functions.  As  described  above,  the values  of  the  short and 
long  term premiums at each date are calculated  by subtracting the ex- 
pectations  component  of  short and long  rates (based  on  forecasts  of 
future values of the funds rate) from the short and long rates themselves. 
In this base  case  analysis,  equivalent  results  are obtained by directly 
including  the short and long rates in the VAR  (ordered after the funds 
rate),  and the implied  responses  for short and long  rates are included 
in figure 3. In the data, there are large low-frequency  movements in the 
term premium  of  the  long  rate,  with  trend increases  of  about  1 per- I  Cl 
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centage  point in both the  1970s  and the  1980s.  We remove  this trend 
variation with a cubic spline (specified  as described in note 21).  As we 
report in the section  on robustness  below,  leaving  the long  premium 
undetrended does not significantly  affect the results .9  Impulse response 
functions  to the funds rate innovation  in figure 3 are shown with one- 
standard-error bands. 
The  results  of  this  exercise  will  look  quite  familiar  to  those  who 
know the recent VAR literature on the effects  of monetary policy.  The 
innovation  to the funds rate (initially  25 basis points,  peaking at about 
35 basis points) is largely transitory, mostly dying away in the first nine 
months.  Output declines  relatively  quickly,  reaching a trough at about 
eighteen  to  twenty-four  months  and then  gradually  recovering.  The 
price  level  responds  sluggishly,  but eventually  declines,  nearly  two 
years after the policy  innovation.  Commodity  prices also decline,  and 
do so much more quickly  than does the general price level. 
The model's  only exclusion  restriction,  that the funds rate does  not 
belong  in the "upper block"  (which includes the oil indicator, output, 
prices,  and commodity  prices),  conditional  on the presence  of  short- 
term and long-term  interest rates in that block,  is marginally rejected: 
the p  values  for the exclusion  of  the funds rate from the upper block 
are, respectively,  0.01  for the output equation,  0.06  for the price level 
equation,  0.23  for the commodity  price equation,  and 0.18  for the oil 
equation.  However,  the  effects  of  this  exclusion  do  not  seem  to  be 
economically  very significant.  For example,  if we compare the effects 
of a funds rate shock on output in the restricted, seven-variable  system 
with  the  analogous  effects  in  the  conventional,  unrestricted,  five- 
variable  system  (excluding  the market interest rates),  we  obtain  vir- 
tually identical  results. 
An  interesting  new  feature  of  the  seven-variable  system  is  that it 
allows one to examine the responses of market interest rates to monetary 
policy  innovations,  and in particular, to compare these responses to the 
predictions  of the pure expectations  hypothesis.  Looking  first at short- 
39.  Fuhrer (1996)  shows  that the large movements  in the long rate can be explained 
in  a  way  consistent  with  the  expectations  hypothesis  if  the  market was  making  rate 
forecasts  at each date based on a particular set of beliefs  about how the Federal Reserve's 
objective  function  has varied over time.  However,  there is nothing in Fuhrer's analysis 
that connects  these hypothesized  beliefs  with the actual time-series  behavior of the funds 
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term (three-month)  rates, a 25 basis point innovation  to the funds rate 
implies about a 15 basis point increase in the short rate, and the two 
rates  then  decline synchronously.  This seems quantitatively  reasonable. 
To check the consistency of this response  with the expectations  hypoth- 
esis, one can look at the behavior  of the short  rate  term  premium,  which, 
by construction,  is the difference  between the actual  short  term  rate  and 
the short term rate implied by the pure expectations hypothesis. The 
short  rate  term  premium  is significantly  negative  immediately  following 
a funds rate innovation, implying that in the first  month  or two after  an 
innovation  to the funds rate, the short-term  interest  rate is estimated  to 
respond less than would be predicted  by the expectations hypothesis. 
However, the short  rate  term  premium  quickly  becomes statistically  and 
economically insignificant,  suggesting that  the expectations  hypothesis 
is a reasonable  description  of the link between the funds rate and the 
short-term  interest  rate after the first month. 
The long-term interest rate is a different story. As shown in fig- 
ure 3, the long rate responds  by about  5 basis points to the impact  of a 
25 basis point innovation in the funds rate, and the response remains 
above zero for some three  years, which again does not seem unreason- 
able. However, comparison  of the responses of the long-term  interest 
rate and the long rate term premium  reveals that they are very close, 
the latter  being slightly less than  the former.  The implication  is that  the 
expectations  theory  explains relatively  little of the relationship  between 
the funds rate and the ten-year government  bond rate. This finding is 
not so surprising,  given the transitory  nature  of funds rate shocks com- 
pared with the duration  of these bonds. The estimated  behavior  of the 
long term premium thus constitutes some evidence that long rates 
"overreact" to short rates, a phenomenon that has frequently been 
documented  in the term  structure  literature  (although,  we appear  to find 
less overreaction  than is typically reported  in the literature).40 
Simulations  of the Effects of an Oil Price  Shock 
Since our expanded  model seems to perform  reasonably  in the case 
of an innovation to monetary  policy, we now turn to the exercise of 
40.  An alternative  explanation  for the overreaction  of the long rate  is that  the policy 
shock is imperfectly  identified.  Note, for example, the slight "output  puzzle"-output 
increases  in the first  few months  after the policy shock. Possibly a better  identification 
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greatest  interest, which is to use the model to decompose the effects of 
an oil price shock into direct and indirect  (that  is, through  endogenous 
monetary  policy) components. Figure 4 shows impulse responses fol- 
lowing a shock to Hamilton's  net oil price increase  measure  under  three 
scenarios. 
The first scenario, which we label "base,"  shows the impulse re- 
sponses of the variables  to a 1 percent  innovation  in the nominal  price 
of oil in the seven-variable  system. This is a normal  VAR simulation, 
except that the funds rate does not enter directly into the equations  for 
output, prices, commodity prices, or the oil indicator. This case is 
intended to show the effects on the economy of an oil price shock, 
including  the endogenous  response  of monetary  policy, in contrast  with 
the next two simulations,  which involve alternative  methods  of shutting 
off the policy response. 
The second scenario we label "Sims-Zha" (with some abuse of 
terminology). In this case we simply fix the funds  rate  at its base values 
throughout  the simulation, in the manner  of Sims and  Zha.41 However, 
recall that in contrast  to the original Sims-Zha  exercise, in our system 
the funds rate does not enter directly into the block of macroeconomic 
variables. Rather,  the funds rate exerts its macroeconomic  effects only 
indirectly, through  the short-term  and long-term  interest  rates included 
in the system. Thus in this exercise, we are effectively allowing the 
change in the funds rate  to act through  its unconstrained,  reduced-form 
impact  on market  interest  rates (which are ordered  after  the funds rate). 
The third  scenario, which we label "anticipated  policy," applies  our 
own methodology, described  above. We again set the funds rate equal 
to its baseline values; that is,  we shut off the response of monetary 
policy to the oil shock and the changes induced by the oil shock in 
output,  prices, and so forth. But in this case, we let the two components 
of short-term  and  long-term  interest  rates  be determined  separately.  The 
expectations  component  of both interest  rates  is set to be consistent  with 
the future  path of the funds rate, as assumed  in the scenario. The short 
and  long term  premiums  are allowed to respond  as estimated  in the base 
model. (Below, we also consider a case where the term premiums  are 
kept at their baseline values.) For the simple, constant  funds rate case 
being examined here, the Sims-Zha and anticipated  policy approaches 
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Figure 4. Responses  to a Hamilton  Oil Price Shock, Seven-Variable  Systema 
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show roughly similar departures from baseline.  Note,  however,  that the 
former cannot distinguish  between  policies  that differ  only  in the ex- 
pected future values  of the funds rate, whereas,  in principle,  the latter 
approach can make that distinction. 
The results of figure 4 are reasonable,  with all variables exhibiting 
their expected  qualitative  behaviors.  In particular, the absence  of  an 
endogenously  restrictive  monetary policy  results in higher output and 
prices,  as one would anticipate. Quantitatively,  the effects  are large, in 
that a nonresponsive  monetary policy  suffices  to eliminate  most of the 
output effect  of  an oil  price shock,  particularly after the first eight  to 
ten months. The conclusion  that a substantial part of the real effects  of 
oil price shocks is due to the monetary policy  response helps to explain 
why  the  effects  of  these  shocks  seems  larger than can  easily  be  ex- 
plained in neoclassical  (flexible  price) models.42 
The anticipated policy  simulation  results in modestly  higher output 
and  price  responses  than  the  Sims-Zha  simulation  in  figure  4.  The 
differences  in results occur largely because the anticipated policy  sim- 
ulation involves  a negative short-run response in both the short and long 
term premiums,  and thus lower interest rates in the short run. Figure 5 
repeats the anticipated policy  simulation  of  figure 4,  but with the re- 
sponse of the term premiums shut off; that is,  the funds rate is allowed 
to affect  the macroeconomic  variables  only  through its effects  on the 
expectations  component  of  market rates.  This  alternative  simulation 
attributes somewhat  less  of  the recession  that follows  an oil  shock  to 
the  monetary  policy  response,  but endogenous  monetary  policy  still 
accounts  for  two-thirds  to  three-fourths  of  the total  effect  of  the  oil 
price shock on output. 
As  another exercise  in counterfactual  policy  simulation,  we  exam- 
ine the three major oil  price shocks  followed  by recessions:  OPEC 1, 
OPEC 2,  and the Iraqi invasion  of Kuwait.  Figure 6 shows  the results, 
focusing  on the behavior of three key variables (output, the price level, 
and the funds rate) for the five-year  periods surrounding each of these 
episodes  (respectively,  1972-76,  1979-83,  and 1988-92).  Each panel 
shows  three paths of  the  given  variable.  One  line  depicts  the  actual 
historical path of the variable.  The line marked "federal  funds endog- 
42.  It should be emphasized  that we are not arguing  that the policies actually fol- 
lowed by the Fed in the face of oil shocks were necessarily  suboptimal;  the usual  output- 
inflation  trade-off  is present  in our  simulations,  and  we do not attempt  a welfare  analysis. Ben S. Bernanke,  Mark Gertler,  and Mark Watson  119 
Figure 5. Responses  to a Hamilton Oil Price Shock, No Premium  Term  Responsea 
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enous"  shows  the  behavior  of  the  system  when  the  oil  variable  is 
repeatedly  shocked,  so  that it traces out its  actual historical  path; all 
other shocks in the system are set to zero; and the funds rate is allowed 
to respond endogenously  to changes in the oil variable and the induced 
changes in output, prices,  and other variables. This scenario is intended 
to isolate  the portion of each recession  that results solely  from the oil 
price shocks  and the associated  monetary policy  response.  Finally,  the 
line  marked  "federal  funds  exogenous"  describes  the  results  of  an 
exercise  in which oil prices equal their historical values, all other shocks 
are shut off,  and the nominal funds rate is arbitrarily fixed at a value 
close  to its initial value in the period.  (Term premiums are allowed  to 
respond to the oil price shock.)  This last scenario eliminates  the policy 
component  of the effect  of the oil price shock,  leaving  only  the direct 
effect  of the change in oil prices on the economy. 
Several  observations  can be made from figure 6.  First, the 1974-75 
decline  in output is generally not well explained by the oil price shock. 
The pattern of shocks reveals,  instead, that the major culprit was (non- 
oil) commodity prices. Commodity prices (not shown) rose very sharply 
before this recession  and stimulated a sharp monetary policy  response 
of  their own,  as can be  seen  by comparing  the historical  path of  the 
funds  rate with  its path in the federal  funds endogenous  scenario,  in 
which  the commodity  price  shocks  are set to zero.  The federal  funds 
exogenous  scenario,  in which the funds rate responds to neither com- 
modity price nor oil price shocks,  exhibits  no recession  at all,  suggest- 
ing that endogenous  monetary policy  (responding to both oil price and 
commodity  price  shocks)  did,  indeed,  play  an important role  in this 
episode. 
The results for 1979-83  generally conform to the conventional  wis- 
dom. The decline  in output through 1981 is well explained by the 1979 
oil price shock and the subsequent response  of monetary policy.  After 
the beginning  of  1982,  the main source of output declines  (according 
to this analysis)  was the lagged  effect  of the autonomous tightening  of 
monetary policy  in late  1980 and 1981.  Note that if one excludes  both 
the monetary policy reaction to the oil price shocks and the autonomous 
tightening  of  monetary  policy  by  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Paul 
Volcker  (as  in  the  federal  funds  exogenous  scenario),  the  1979-83 
period exhibits  only  a modest slowdown,  not a serious recession. 
The experiment  for  1988-92  similarly  shows  that shutting  off  the 122  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
policy response to oil price shocks produces a higher path of output and 
prices  than otherwise;  again,  compare  the  paths  of  the  endogenous 
monetary policy  and exogenous  monetary policy  scenarios.  One puzzle 
that emerges  is  why  the substantial easing  of  actual policy  from late 
1990 did not move  the actual path of  output closer  to the alternative 
policy  scenario.  It is possible  that special  factors,  such as credit prob- 
lems,  may have been at work. 
Oil,  Money,  and the Components of GDP 
The application of our method for separating the direct effects  of oil 
price  shocks  and the  indirect effects  operating  through the monetary 
policy  response  leads to a rather strong conclusion:  the majority of the 
impact of an oil  price shock on the real economy  is attributable to the 
central bank's response to the inflationary pressures engendered by the 
shock. 
A check on the plausibility  of this result, using a different identifying 
assumption and more disaggregated  data, is provided by figure 7.  This 
figure is based on the seven-variable  VAR system employed above (real 
GDP,  the GDP  deflator,  commodity  prices,  the Hamilton  oil  market 
indicator,  the funds rate, and short-term and long-term interest rates), 
with the funds rate excluded from the first four equations. To this system 
we add, one at a time and without feedback into the main system,  eight 
components  of  GDP:  consumption,  producer  durables  expenditure, 
structures  investment,  inventory  investment,  residential  investment, 
government  purchases,  exports,  and imports.43 With these systems  we 
conduct  two  experiments.  First,  we  examine  the  impulse  responses 
obtained when the Hamilton oil price variable is shocked by 1 percent 
and the federal  funds rate is allowed  to respond endogenously  (these 
responses  are shown by dashed lines in figure 7).  Second,  we examine 
the impulse responses to an exogenous  federal funds rate shock of equal 
maximum  value  to the endogenous  response  of  the funds  rate in the 
first scenario  (shown  by  solid  lines).  We  think of  this  exercise  as  a 
comparison  of  the  total  effect  of  an  oil  price  shock,  including  the 
43.  Except  for consumption,  which  is available  at the monthly frequency,  monthly 
data for the GDP components  are interpolated by state space methods; see appendix A. 
Components  are measured relative  to the exponential  of  the trend for the logarithm of 
real GDP,  as calculated  from the spline regression  described  in note 21. 1~~~  i  ..  -  LD 
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endogenous  monetary response,  with the effect of a monetary tightening 
of similar magnitude but not associated  with an oil price shock.  To the 
extent  that the two  responses  are quantitatively  similar,  it seems  rea- 
sonable to attribute most of the total effect  of the oil price shock to the 
monetary policy  response.  Note,  however,  that we are using a different 
identification assumption here than above; that is, we implicitly  assume 
that the economy  responds in the same way to endogenous  and exoge- 
nous tighenings  of monetary policy. 
The results of shown  in figure 7 provide substantial support for the 
view  that the monetary policy  response  is the dominant source of  the 
real effects  of an oil price shock.  In particular, the response  of output 
is virtually identical in the two scenarios,  implying that it matters little 
for real economic  outcomes  whether a change  in monetary policy  of a 
given  magnitude is preceded by an oil price shock or not. Very similar 
responses  across  the two  experiments  are also  found  at the disaggre- 
gated  level,  especially  in  equipment  investment  (producers'  durable 
equipment),  inventory investment,  and residential investment.  Slightly 
greater effects  for the scenario including  the oil price shock are found 
for consumption  and structures (although the latter difference  is quan- 
titatively  small  and statistically  insignificant).  Government purchases 
responds more strongly in the scenario that includes the oil price shock, 
for reasons that are not obvious. 
The differences  between  the two scenarios  are also instructive.  The 
experiment  that includes  the initial  oil  price  shock  does  show  a sub- 
stantial inflationary impact in the short run, which gives some indication 
as to why the Fed responds so vigorously  to such shocks.  On the margin, 
the  oil  price  shock  also  raises  commodity  prices  and the  long-term 
interest rate (presumably,  reflecting  an increased risk premium) and it 
leads to increased real exports and decreased real imports (net of terms- 
of-trade effects).  These responses  are as expected. 
Some Alternative Experiments 
Although we have focused  on the role of systematic monetary policy 
in propagating oil price shocks,  our methodology  applies equally  well 
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of  our method,  we  briefly consider  two  alternative cases:  a shock  to 
commodity  prices and a shock to output. 
A COMMODITY PRICE SHOCK.  Figure 8 looks  at the effects  of a shock 
to the commodity  price index in our original seven-variable  system.  As 
with the oil  price  shock  studied in figures 4 and 5,  we  consider  three 
scenarios.  First, in the base scenario we calculate the impulse responses 
resulting  from a  1 percent innovation  in commodity  prices,  allowing 
monetary policy  (as represented by the federal funds rate) to respond 
in its normal way.  Second,  we examine  the effects  of shutting off  the 
policy  response,  using  the  Sims-Zha  methodology  described  above. 
Finally,  we  shut off  the  monetary  policy  response  by  means  of  our 
anticipated policy  approach.  For simplicity,  in the anticipated policy 
simulation  we  set the responses  of  the term premiums to zero  (as  in 
figure 5),  so that both short-term and long-term nominal interest rates 
are effectively  assumed  not  to  respond  to  the  shock  to  commodity 
prices. 
Figure 8 shows  that a 1 percent innovation  in commodity  prices has 
an ambiguous  effect  on  output: real GDP  rises  for the first year but 
declines  thereafter.  Prices  rise  unambiguously.  One  explanation  for 
these results is that what we are labeling a positive  shock to commodity 
prices  is,  in fact,  a mixture of  an adverse  shock  to aggregate  supply 
and an expansionary shock to aggregate demand. The federal funds rate 
rises sharply in response to an increase in commodity  prices,  which we 
interpret as the Fed's  response  to the inflationary surge; other interest 
rates also rise.  The oil price indicator responds very little in the short 
run to a commodity  price innovation,  which is reassuring,  in the sense 
that  it  confirms  that  the  commodity  and oil  price  variables  are  not 
excessively  collinear. 
Shutting down the monetary policy response to the commodity price 
shock,  by either the Sims-Zha  or the anticipated policy  method,  leads 
to the expected  response.  Analogous  to the case of oil price shocks,  the 
recessionary  impact of a commodity  price shock is eliminated  and the 
inflationary impact is magnified.  Although it may well  be the case that 
the innovation  in commodity  prices  is not a cleanly  identified  supply 
shock,  there is  no evidence  that an increase  in commodity  prices  de- 
presses real activity  in the absence of a monetary policy  response. 
AN  OUTPUT  SHOCK.  Figure 9 shows analogous results when the driving 
shock is a shock to output. As with the commodity  shock,  we compute 126  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Figure  8. Responses  to a Commodity  Price Shock,  No Term Premium  Response" 
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Figure 9. Responses  to an Output Shock, No Term  Premium Responsea 
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the impulse  response  functions  for three cases:  a base  case  in which 
monetary policy  is allowed  to respond in its normal way to the output 
shock,  and cases  corresponding to the Sims-Zha and anitcipated policy 
methods for shutting down the policy  response.  As before,  we assume 
no response  of the term premiums. 
Admittedly,  like a shock to commodity  prices,  an output shock does 
not have a clear a priori economic  interpretation; it is an amalgam of 
various  random  factors  affecting  output,  holding  constant  the  other 
variables included  in the system.  However,  based on figure 9 it seems 
reasonable to interpret output shocks in this system as being dominated 
by aggregate  demand fluctuations: a positive  output shock is followed 
by increases in oil prices, commodity prices, and the general price level, 
as well  as in all three interest rates. Because  the historical tendency of 
monetary policy  is to "lean  against the wind,"  when the normal policy 
response  is shut off,  the effects  of the aggregate demand shock (as we 
interpret the output shock)  are all the greater.  Figure 9 shows  that in 
the Sims-Zha  and anticipated policy  scenarios,  the output effect  of the 
shock is much more persistent and prices rise by more than in the base 
case.  Interest rates are lower,  reflecting  easier  monetary policy.  Note 
that in this  analysis,  the Sims-Zha  and anticipated policy  approaches 
give  almost identical results. 
These  experiments  demonstrate that our methods for shutting down 
the response  of monetary policy  are applicable to,  and give  reasonable 
results for,  shocks  other than oil price shocks.  It would be interesting 
to combine our methodology  with identified VAR techniques that could 
give  a sharper structural interpretation to innovations  estimated  in the 
macro block of the model. 
Robustness and Stability 
We return to our main theme,  the role of systematic  monetary policy 
in amplifying  the real effects  of  oil  price shocks,  to consider  the ro- 
bustness  and stability of our results. 
Robustness  of the Results 
We perform a variety of checks for robustness,  some of which (such 
as shutting down the term premium response)  are alluded to above.  To Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson  129 
provide  more  systematic  information,  table  1 reports some  summary 
statistics  from alternative specifications  of our VAR  system.  We con- 
sider  (a)  three  alternative  oil-market  indicators;  (b)  three alternative 
orderings of variables within the VAR; and (c) two alternative detrend- 
ing assumptions.  We also calculated results for alternative measures of 
output (for example,  industrial production),  alternative measures of the 
price level  (for example,  the personal consumption expenditure deflator 
and the consumer price index),  and alternative interest rate maturities; 
but since none of these variable substitutions have important effects  on 
our findings,  they are omitted from the table. 
The first row of table  1 reports results for the Hamilton oil indicator 
(our base  specification),  whereas the second  and third rows  substitute 
the Mork and Hoover-Perez  indicators,  respectively  (see figure 2). The 
fourth row corresponds  to ordering the federal funds rate after, rather 
than before,  the two  open  market interest rates.  The fifth row orders 
the Hamilton oil market indicator first in the system,  and the sixth row 
orders the oil market indicator third-after  output and prices, but before 
the commodity  price index.  The  seventh  row is for a specification  in 
which  output and the long  rate term premium are not detrended,  and 
the  eighth  row  reports  results  when  all  variables  in  the  system  are 
detrended by a cubic spline  (as described in note 21). 
For each  of  the eight  alternative  specifications,  table  1 reports the 
effects  on output and prices of a 1 percent oil price shock,  under (a) a 
standard simulation,  allowing  for the endogenous  response of policy  to 
the oil  price shock;  (b) the Sims-Zha  simulation,  in which  the federal 
funds rate is fixed  at its baseline  value;  and (c)  the anticipated policy 
simulation.  Under  the  heading  "output,"  we  report the  sum  of  the 
impulse response coefficients  for output for the first twenty-four months 
after the oil price shock,  which we employ  as a measure of the output 
loss associated  with the shock.  Under the heading "prices,"  we report 
the twenty-fourth  impulse  response  coefficient  for prices,  divided  by 
two,  which  can be interpreted as the increment in the annual average 
inflation  rate over  the  first two  years  following  the  shock.  Standard 
errors, calculated  by Monte  Carlo methods  employing  500  draws per 
specification,  are shown  in parentheses.  The table also shows  the dif- 
ferences between the baseline (endogenous  policy)  specification  and the 
results  obtained  under the  Sims-Zha  and anticipated  policy  assump- 
tions,  again with the associated  standard errors. -r  t-o  e-  i-O  o-  nn  n-  oc 
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The point estimates  reported in table  1 are consistent  with the find- 
ings  discussed  above  (in figures 4 and 5,  for example).  In particular, 
the baseline  simulations  show that an oil price shock depresses  output 
and increases  inflation,  by magnitudes that are reasonably comparable 
across all specifications.  The Sims-Zha method of shutting off the mon- 
etary policy  response  tends  to  eliminate  all  or  most  of  the  negative 
effect  of  the  oil  price  shock  and,  in  almost  all  cases,  increases  the 
inflationary impact, as expected.  The anticipated policy method of elim- 
inating  the policy  response  has even  larger effects,  fully  eliminating 
the recessionary  impact of the oil price shock in all cases.  The standard 
errors for most entries in table  1 are quite high,  reflecting the fact that 
the standard error bands on the impulse response  functions  spread out 
rather quickly.44 However,  the differences  in the output responses  be- 
tween  the baseline  and alternative simulations  are statistically  signifi- 
cant in a number of  cases,  in particular, when the policy  response  is 
shut down by the Sims-Zha  method.45 
In general,  our results  appear to be  qualitatively  robust,  although 
they are not always  precisely  estimated.  In particular, a view  that as- 
cribes  most or even  all of  the real effects  of  an oil  price shock to the 
endogenous  monetary  response  does  not  seem  inconsistent  with  the 
data. 
Stability of the Results:  The Role of a Changing Policy  Response 
We take up the issue of subsample stability not only as a qualification 
of  our results,  but also  because  it  appears that at least  some  of  the 
observed  instabilities  of  our system  can be given  an interesting  eco- 
nomic  interpretation.  Indeed,  we  show  that variations  in the Federal 
Reserve's  reaction function  have  something  of  the flavor of  a natural 
44.  The standard errors are particularly high for the anticipated policy  simulations, 
apparently reflecting,  in part, the uncertainty associated  with the long-term  interest rate 
forecasts  required by this method. 
45.  We  also  considered  alternative  models  estimated  with  twelve  lags,  rather than 
the seven  chosen  by AIC.  In this case,  the finding that shutting off  the monetary policy 
response  eliminates  the effect  of  the oil  shock  obtains  at short horizons  but not at the 
twenty-four-month  horizon.  The reason is that with twelve  lags,  the funds rate is esti- 
mated to rise in response to an oil price shock,  but then to fall quickly below  trend. Our 
alternative policy,  which assumes  no response throughout,  is thus not effectively  easier 
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experiment,  which may help to improve the identification of the endog- 
enous policy  effect. 
Some  tests  of  the stability  of  the coefficients  in our seven-variable 
base VAR,  with lag lengths chosen  by the Bayes  information criterion, 
are reported in table 2. For simplicity,  the funds rate is allowed to enter 
all equations.  The upper panel,  labeled  "Quandt tests,"  gives  asymp- 
totic p  values  for the hypothesis  that the coefficients  of  the  variable 
listed in the column heading, together with the regression constant term, 
are stable  over  the  sample  period  in  the  equation  given  by  the  row 
heading.  Thus,  for example,  the Quandt tests show that the hypothesis 
that the coefficients  on the price level  in the oil equation are stable over 
the entire  sample  can be rejected  at the 0.016  confidence  level.  In a 
similar format, the Chow split-sample  tests reported in the lower panel 
of table 2 tests each set of coefficients  for stability across the two halves 
of  the  sample.  These  tests  are included  because,  unlike  the  Quandt 
tests,  they are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
There is substantial evidence  of instability  in the VAR system.  The 
equation for the price level  is clearly quite unstable,  with p values near 
zero for most blocks  of coefficients.  The Quandt tests also suggest  that 
there  is  instability  in the  coefficients  relating  the  funds rate and the 
short-term and long-term  interest rates.  Nevertheless,  stability  of  the 
output equation cannot be rejected. 
It appears,  however,  that at least some  of the instability  in the link 
between  oil  and the macroeconomy  may be due to a shift in the policy 
response.  Figure  10 illustrates this point.  The figure shows the output, 
price level,  and federal  funds rate responses  to an oil  price shock,  as 
implied  by systems  estimated  over the whole  sample and over each of 
the three decades  of the sample (1966-75,  1976-85,  and 1986-95). 
The full  sample estimates  of the effects  of an oil price shock are as 
seen  above.  Note,  though,  how  the responses  vary over  subsamples 
(keeping  in mind that ten-year subsamples  are short for this purpose). 
The output response across different periods is inversely correlated with 
the funds rate response.  The  sharpest decline  in output occurs  in the 
period  1976-85,  which  also  exhibits  the  most  aggressive  rise  in the 
funds rate. The strong response  of monetary policy  during this period 
presumably reflects the Federal Reserve's  substantially  increased con- 
cern with inflation during the Volcker  regime.  The output response  is 
weakest  in the  1986-95  subsample.  In this case,  there is virtually  no 00  > 
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response in the funds rate. The atypical behavior of the funds rate during 
this period may reflect the presence of confounding  factors,  such as the 
weakness of financial sector balance sheets and the decline in consumer 
confidence  that depressed the economy  at the time of the one major oil 
shock of that subsample,  the 1990 increase in prices.  In any event,  the 
subsample evidence  is highly consistent with the view that the reduced- 
form impact of oil on the economy  depends significantly  on the mone- 
tary policy  reaction function. 
Conclusion 
This paper offers both methodological  and substantive contributions. 
Methodologically,  we  show  how  to modify  standard VAR  systems  to 
permit simulations  of the economy  under alternative endogenous  poli- 
cies.  Since our focus is on quantifying the economic  impact of historical 
feedback policies,  the alternative policy that we consider is very simple; 
a virtue of  our approach is that it would  not be difficult  to extend  the 
analysis to consider more interesting alternatives, for example,  "Taylor 
rules."  It would  also be interesting to compare our results with those 
obtained from alternative (possibly,  more structural) methodologies. 
Substantively,  our results suggest that an important part of the effect 
of oil  price  shocks  on the economy  results not from the change  in oil 
prices,  per se,  but from the resulting  tightening  of  monetary policy. 
This finding may help to explain the apparently large effects  of oil price 
changes  found by Hamilton and many others. 
APPENDIX  A 
Interpolation  of Monthly  NIPA Variables 
IN THIS  PAPER  we  use  interpolated  monthly  values  of  GDP,  the com- 
ponents  of  GDP,  and the GDP  deflator.  This  appendix describes  the 
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sults  are available  on  a distribution  diskette  from the  authors,  upon 
request. 
We designate  quarterly series  by capital letters and monthly  series 
by lower-case  letters.  Quarters are indexed  by T  =  1, 2,  ...,  N,  and 
months by t  =  1, 2,  ...,  n. Let QT  be an (observed)  quarterly variable 
that is  to  be  interpolated-for  example,  real  GDP-and  let  ST  be  a 
scaling  variable such that YT  QTIST  is nontrending.  Similarly,  let q, 
be the (unobserved) monthly series corresponding to QT-for  example, 
montly real GDP-and  let s, be a scaling  variable such that y,  q,/s,  is 
nontrending.  QT  and q, are related by the identity 
2 
1 
QT  3  -  q3T-i, 
and hence  YT  and y, are related by the identity 
=  1  2 
YT  3  Y3T_  i(S3T  i/ST) 
Interpolation is by state space methods. Suppose that there is a vector 
of (observable)  interpolator variables at the monthly level,  x,; industrial 
production,  for example,  is a monthly variable that provides  informa- 
tion about within-quarter movements  of real GDP. We assume that the 
unobserved  monthly  variable y, is related to the interpolator variables 
according to the "causal,"  or "transition,"  equation 
y,=  x,'  +  u,, 
where 
u,  =  pu,_,  +  E,,  E,  -  N(O,&2). 
In our  application,  all  transition  equations  include  a constant  term. 
When one or more of the interpolators becomes  available  midsample, 
all  interpolators  (including  the  constant  term)  are interacted  with 
dummy  variables  and the  possibility  of  a shift  in the  value  of  .2  is 
allowed  for. 
Let z, be a monthly  "indicator"  variable that equals Y,,3  in the third 
month of  each  quarter and is  zero  otherwise.  Then  the  indicator,  or 
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2 
z,=  E  y,ti(s,tJlS3,),  t  =  3,  6,  9,  12,  ...,n 
and 
z=0  x  y,, for all other values of t. 
The parameters p,  p, and 02  are estimated by maximum likelihood, 
assuming Gaussian errors. Conditional on the estimated parameters, let 
ytl, =  E,yt,  where  E  is  the  expectations  operator.  The  interpolated 
values,  given  the full information set,  are thus given by 
qt,E  =  ytl,,st. 
This  method  is  similar  to  that proposed  by  Chow  and  Lin  (1971), 
although it allows  for a more general treatment of the serial correlation 
in u,. 
To estimate  the accuracy of the interpolation,  one can use R2 mea- 
sures of fit. In levels,  the measure of fit is 
R,eis  =  var(y2,,)/var(y2), 
and in differences  it is 
R  =  var(zAy2,,)/var(zAy2). 
Table  Al  lists  the  quarterly series  that we  interpolate,  the corre- 
sponding monthly interpolators, and the measures of fit (corresponding 
to  the  scaled  values  of  the  variables).  Variables  are listed  by  their 
CITIBASE  mnemonics,  which  are defined  in  appendix  B.  The  scale 
variables used for real flow variables are personal consumption  expen- 
ditures (GMCQ),  at both the quarterly and monthly levels.  The personal 
consumption  expenditure deflator (GMDC),  monthly and quarterly, is 
used as the scale  variable in the interpolation of the GDP deflator. 
Consumption data (disaggregated  to durables, nondurables, and ser- 
vices)  exist  at a monthly  frequency  and thus do not have to be inter- 
polated.  Monthly  GDP  is calculated  as the sum of  the monthly  GDP 
components  (we  ignore  the  slight  deviations  from  that relationship 
caused by chain weighting). 
The R2 values  suggest  that the interpolators explain nearly all of the 
variability  in  the  levels  of  the  scaled  series.  With  the exceptions  of 
government consumption and the GDP deflator, they also explain nearly 
all of the implied  month-to-month  variation in the series. Ben S. Bernanke,  Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson  139 
Table  Al.  Interpolators  and Goodness  of Fit 
Quarterly series  Monthly  R2, by specification 
interpolateda  interpolatorsa  Levels  Differences 




GIPDQ  IPE  0.999  0.775 
MSNDFb 
MSMAEb 








GVQ  A IVMFGQ  0.970  0.929 
A IVRRQ 
A IVWRQ 
GGEQ  CONQC  0.999  0.633 
IPH 
FBOb 
GEXQ  FSE602  0.999  0.919 
FTE71 
FTEF 
GIMQ  FSM612  0.998  0.861 
FTM333 
FTM732 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data described in appendix B. 
a. Series identified by CITIBASE mnemonics, see appendix B. 
b. Available beginning in January 1968. 
APPENDIX  B 
Data 
THIS APPENDIX  describes  the data series used in the paper. All data are 
from the CITIBASE  electronic  database,  available  from Citicorp  Da- 
tabase  Services.  Series  are identified  by  their CITIBASE  mnemonic 
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Quarterly series 
GDPD  GDP deflator,  index, 1992 =  100. 
GEXQ  Exports  of goods and services, chained  1992 dollars. 
GGEQ  Government  consumption  expenditures  and gross investment, 
chained  1992 dollars. 
GIMQ  Imports  of goods and services, chained  1992 dollars. 
GIPDQ  Investment,  producers'  durables,  chained  1992 dollars. 
GIRQ  Investment,  residential,  chained  1992 dollars. 
GISQ  Investment,  nonresidential  structures,  chained  1992 dollars. 
GVQ  Change  in business  inventories,  total, chained  1992 dollars. 
Monthly series 
CONCC  Construction  put in place, commercial,  seasonally adjusted, 
1987 dollars. 
CONFRC Construction  put  in place, private  residential  building,  season- 
ally adjusted,  1987 dollars. 
CONIC  Construction  put in place, industrial  building, seasonally  ad- 
justed, 1987 dollars. 
CONQC  Construction  put in place, public, seasonally  adjusted, 1987 
dollars. 
FBO  Federal  budget, net outlay, not seasonally  adjusted;  deflated 
by interpolated  government  purchases  deflator  (GDFGEC), 
seasonally  adjusted  by the authors  by means  of a regression  on 
monthly  dummies. 
FSE602  Exports,  excluding  military  aid  shipments,  seasonally  adjusted; 
deflated  by the PPI  for finished  goods (PWF). 
FSM612  General  imports,  seasonally  adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI for 
finished  goods (PWF). 
FTE71  U.S.  merchandise  exports, nonelectrical  machinery,  season- 
ally adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI  for machinery  and  equipment 
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FTEF  U.S.  merchandise  exports, agricultural  products,  seasonally 
adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI for farm products, processed 
foods, and  feeds (PWFPF). 
FTM333  U.S.  merchandise  imports, petroleum,  and petroleum  prod- 
ucts, seasonally  adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI for crude  petro- 
leum (PW561). 
FTM732  U.S. merchandise  imports,  automobiles  and parts, seasonally 
adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI  for motor  vehicles and  equipment 
(PWAUTO). 
FYFF  Federal  funds  rate, percent. 
FYGM3  Interest  rate, three-month  Treasury  bills from the secondary 
market,  percent. 
FYGT5  Interest  rate,  five-year  Treasury  bonds,  constant  maturity,  from 
the secondary  market,  percent. 
FYGT10  Interest  rate,  ten-year  Treasury  bonds,  constant  maturity,  from 
the secondary  market,  percent. 
GMCQ  Personal consumption expenditures, seasonally adjusted, 
chained  1992 dollars. 
GMCDQ  Personal  consumption  expenditures,  durables,  seasonally  ad- 
justed, chained  1992 dollars. 
GMCNQ  Personal  consumption  expenditures,  nondurables,  seasonally 
adjusted,  chained  1992 dollars. 
GMCSQ  Personal  consumption  expenditures,  services, seasonally ad- 
justed, chained  1992 dollars. 
GMDC  Implicit  price  deflator,  personal  consumption  expenditures,  in- 
dex,  1987  =  100. 
HSF  Housing  starts,  new private  housing  units,  seasonally  adjusted. 
IP  Industrial  production  index, total, seasonally  adjusted, 1987 
=  100. 
IPE  Industrial  production  index, business equipment,  seasonally 
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IPH  Industrial  production  index, defense  and  space  equipment,  sea- 
sonally adjusted, 1987  =  100. 
IPIC  Industrial  production  index, construction  supplies, seasonally 
adjusted, 1987  =  100. 
IVMFGQ Inventories,  manufacturing,  seasonally  adjusted,  chained  1992 
dollars. 
IVRRQ  Manufacturing  and trade  inventories,  retail trade, seasonally 
adjusted,  chained  1992 dollars. 
IVWRQ  Manufacturing  and trade inventories,  merchant  wholesalers, 
seasonally  adjusted,  chained  1992 dollars. 
MMCON Manufacturing  shipments,  construction  materials  and  supplies, 
seasonally  adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI  for materials  and  com- 
ponents  for manufacturing  (PWIMSM). 
MSMAE  Manufacturing  shipments,  machinery  and  equipment,  season- 
ally adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI  for machinery  and  equipment 
(PWME). 
MSNDF  Manufacturing  shipments, nondefense capital goods indus- 
tries, seasonally  adjusted;  deflated  by the PPI  for capital  equip- 
ment  (PWFP). 
PSCCOM Spot market  price index, all commodities,  from Commodity 
Research  Bureau,  not seasonally  adjusted,  1967 =  100. 
PUNEW  CPI-U, all items, seasonally  adjusted,  1982-84  =  100. 
PW561  PPI, crude  petroleum,  not seasonally  adjusted,  1982 =  100. 
PWFPSA PPI, capital  equipment,  seasonally  adjusted,  1982 =  100. 
PWFSA  PPI, finished  goods, seasonally  adjusted,  1982 =  100. 
PWIMSA PPI, intermediate  materials,  supplies, and components,  sea- 
sonally adjusted, 1982  =  100. 
PWCMSA  PPI, crude  materials,  seasonally  adjusted,  1982 =  100. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Christopher  A.  Sims:  The broad aim of this paper is to go beyond the 
result,  now widely  confirmed in the empirical time-series  literature on 
monetary policy,  that surprise changes  in monetary policy  are a minor 
source of economic  fluctuations.  The nature of systematic  reactions of 
monetary policy  to the state of the economy  could be a major determi- 
nant of the character of fluctuations,  even  though erratic disturbances 
to monetary policy  are not.  The  paper concludes  that the evidence  is 
consistent  with  a major role  for  monetary  policy;  so  large  that,  for 
example,  most of the observed output effects  of oil price shocks would 
disappear with a different monetary policy. 
I agree with the main conclusion  of the paper, but only because  the 
authors have been so careful in stating it. I would emphasize more than 
they do how much uncertainty remains about the size of the real effects 
of  monetary policy.  It remains possible  for a skeptic  to maintain the 
view  that the effects  of both systematic  and random shifts in monetary 
policy  are  negligibly  small.  My  comments  therefore  emphasize  the 
reasons to doubt that the effects of systematic monetary policy are large, 
despite the paper's evidence  to the contrary. 
The authors pursue their aim by focusing  attention primarily on the 
reaction of the economy  to surprise changes  in oil prices.  On the face 
of it, this focus is appealing,  because most economists  believe  that they 
know roughly when large surprise changes  in oil prices have occurred 
and have  little  doubt  that these  changes  were  distinct  from  surprise 
changes  in  monetary  policy.  Identification-separation  of  the  inter- 
pretable disturbance from other sources of variation in the data-there- 
143 144  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
fore promises to be easier than it would be with other types of private 
sector disturbances.  This idea, it seems to me, has not turned  out as 
well as one might have hoped. 
In the first  place, the intuition  that  historical  oil price "shocks" are 
well understood  and  easily identified  is incorrect.  Although  Hamilton's 
original work did not require  elaborate  filtering  of the data, it appears 
that to extend it to the current  time does require  such filtering. In the 
present  paper, four different  measures  of oil price shocks are shown in 
figure  2 to deliver four quite distinct  estimated  effects on the economy. 
The authors  choose to proceed  with Hamilton's  filtration  of the oil price 
data to generate  their oil price shocks. 
As the paper notes, the estimated  effects of the oil price shock are 
small: a  1 percent oil price shock-which,  by the definition of the 
variable, is expected to lead to a fairly persistent  change in the actual 
level of oil prices-leads,  in figure  4, only to a 0.02 percent  response 
of the price level and a 0.025 percent output response at the peak of 
the responses. This is the size of the pure supply-side effect on GDP 
that  one would expect if oil-related  energy inputs  had a 2 percent  factor 
share, and most economists would expect estimated  reduced-form  ef- 
fects of oil price increases to be larger than that. (This assumes that 
domestic oil is treated  correctly  as a primary  input and that imports  of 
foreign oil are treated  correctly  as intermediate  inputs  in GDP account- 
ing, a perhaps dubious assumption.) It would be useful in assessing 
these results  to know both  the response  of the oil price  level, as opposed 
to the filtered variable, to this shock and the size of a one standard 
deviation shock to the filtered  oil price measure. 
Furthermore,  though  taken  from different  models, both the first  row 
of table 1 and the error  bands in the bottom row of figure 2 show that 
the responses of the variables  to an oil shock could easily be zero and 
yet still consistent with the data; one-standard-error  bands about the 
responses  barely  clear zero. It is true that table 1 shows that  the differ- 
ence in the response  of the economy in the case where monetary  policy 
responds  according  to historical norms and the case where it pegs the 
interest  rate is fairly sharply  defined  by the data and is in the direction 
expected  by the authors.  But since the oil shock itself has turned  out to 
be something  of a will-o'-the-wisp, the idea that economists' intuitive 
knowledge  of the size and nature  of oil shocks would help with identi- 
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The paper also shows some results for "output" and "commodity 
price" shocks. These are derived from the statistical model and are 
harder  to interpret  than oil shocks. The model gives them no interpre- 
tation, except that  they are different  from and independent  of monetary 
policy shocks. But while these model-based  shocks probably  mix con- 
ceptually  distinct  non-monetary  policy influences  on the economy, they 
do have the advantage  of having large effects and accounting  for much 
of the observed variance  in the data. It is encouraging  to see in figures 
8 and  9 that  the effects of systematic  monetary  policy as measured  with 
the oil shocks seem to be confirmed  with the output  and price shocks, 
but it is disappointing  that all of the careful analysis of robustness  and 
statistical strength  centers on the less sharply  defined  oil price shocks. 
The authors  point out that previous experiments  with analyzing the 
effects of systematic changes in monetary policy in identified VAR 
models have stuck to replacing the estimated  policy rule in the model 
with something else. This kind of exercise implicitly assumes that in 
forming expectations of future policy actions, private agents treat all 
deviations of policy variables  from their  historical  patterns  of behavior 
as unsystematic  deviations from the historical policy rule. The Lucas 
critique warns that this can lead to error. 
My own view of the Lucas critique  is that  it explains that  it is always 
a mistake to imagine that one can implement changes in policy that 
have probability  zero according  to the model of policy underlying  pri- 
vate sector behavior. The implication is that if one can contemplate 
changing  the coefficients of the "rule," or "reaction function," those 
coefficients should have been modeled as stochastic in the first place. 
There  is an internal  contradiction  in pretending  that  one can change  the 
coefficients, even though the public is modeled as absolutely certain 
that they can never change. 
While this point is correct  in principle, it is difficult  to implement  in 
practice. Especially for policy changes quite different from any that 
have been observed  historically, estimation  of an appropriate  stochastic 
model that allows for such changes will be difficult and may need to 
rely heavily on guesswork  and  a priori  knowledge. It is therefore  a good 
idea, where possible, to focus attention  on policy changes that are not 
too dramatic,  which can reasonably  be modeled  as sequences  of random 
disturbances  to the policy behavior that is explicit in the model. This 
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coefficients  that in the model are treated as nonstochastic.  The changes 
in coefficients  are best chosen  so as to correspond to not too dramatic 
sequences  of shocks  to the model's  original policy  rule. 
The type of rule change  studied in this paper-a  shift to an exoge- 
nously  fixed funds rate from a historical policy  that, by contrast, made 
the funds rate react very sharply to inflationary disturbances-is  dra- 
matic.  As  is  made clear  in the recent  literature on the interaction  of 
monetary  and fiscal  policy,  in  particular,  the  seminal  paper by  Eric 
Leeper, a fixed interest rate as policy rule (contrary to some discussions 
elsewhere  in the  literature) is  consistent  with  a uniquely  determined 
price level. ' However,  this is true only  if the fixed interest rate rule is 
accompanied  by an appropriate fiscal policy,  and the appropriate fiscal 
policy  in this case  is quite different from that consistent  with a deter- 
minate  price  level  in the context  of  an "anti-inflationary"  monetary 
policy.  Since  in this authors' model fiscal policy  has to be thought of 
as wrapped into the "non-monetary  policy"  sector,  one would expect 
to find that changing  the monetary policy  rule alone to a fixed interest 
rate form would imply unsustainably explosive  behavior of prices; and 
indeed,  figures 4,  5,  8,  and 9 show  that this is exactly  what emerges. 
Private agents are likely  to recognize  that such a shift in the monetary 
policy  rule is unsustainable  and therefore to expect  it to end,  or to be 
followed  by a shift in fiscal policy.  This makes interpreting the effects 
of the authors' exercise  rather difficult.  Their paper in places  reads as 
if a different monetary policy  might actually have eliminated the output 
effects  of oil price or even output shocks.  But since the alternate mon- 
etary policy  considered  is not sustainable,  this interpretation does  not 
seem to me correct. The simulations suggest instead only that by delay- 
ing or dampening an interest rate response to inflationary pressures, the 
monetary authority can trade delay or dampening of the output effects 
for increased  inflationary effects.  It would  also  have been  interesting 
to see an analysis of effects  of less extreme shifts in the policy rule that 
would  have  been  sustainable;  for example,  smaller  or slower,  rather 
than zero,  interest rate responses. 
The authors attempt to respond to the Lucas critique by building into 
the  model  one  particular form  of  endogenous  adjustment of  private 
sector expectations  to the change  in policy  rule. They impose  the the- 
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oretical  term  structure relationships  between  the  federal  funds  rate, 
another short rate, and a long rate. Then they attribute to those private 
agents doing  interest rate arbitrage perfect foresight  of the new policy 
fixing  the federal  funds  rate.  It is  apparent from the figures that this 
modification of the model does nothing to correct the fundamental prob- 
lem that the change  in policy  rule is unsustainable.  Indeed,  one might 
think that the sector most likely  to realize that fixing the federal funds 
rate is  not  a sustainable  policy,  in the  absence  of  a change  in  fiscal 
policy,  is the bond market. Requiring that the bond market, but no one 
else,  treat the policy  as firmly in place forever therefore seems  exactly 
backward from what might be plausible.  Furthermore, this adjustment 
to the model is not in fact very large,  as is made clear by the closeness 
of the simulation  paths for many variables  in cases  where this adjust- 
ment is imposed  and in those where it is not. The estimated  statistical 
model  already captures the strong tendency  of  the federal  funds  rate 
and other short rates to move  together-a  relation  not very  different 
from the theoretical term structure relationship.  And the connection  of 
long rates to short rates, although it differs more between  simulations, 
appears not to be of great importance for predicting the effects of shocks 
on prices and output. 
Thus the exercise  undertaken here is a step toward modeling  private 
sector learning behavior that might, in principle, be useful.  But because 
the term structure relationships are simple and well approximated in the 
original estimated model,  it does not seem to me likely  that this partic- 
ular aspect of private sector expectations  is of central importance in this 
endeavor. 
The entire identified VAR literature on the effects of monetary policy 
runs the risk of overestimating  the real effects  of monetary policy.  It is 
not hard to construct a stochastic equilibrium model in which monetary 
policy  is neutral and certain types  of technology  shocks  raise real in- 
terest rates and, later, lower real output. The essential  ingredients  are 
conventional  Solow-residual  technology  shocks and increasing costs in 
the investment  goods  industry (or within-firm  adjustment costs  to in- 
vestment).  If the monetary authority did not react to such shocks,  they 
would be a source of movements  of interest rates and output in opposite 
directions  that was  not  related  to  price  behavior  or to  money  stock 
behavior. One might think of the identified VAR literature on the effects 
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time-series model in which some shock, labeled "monetary policy" 
and orthogonal  to other shocks, moves interest  rates up, money down, 
output  down, and prices down, with possible delays in all these effects 
except the interest  rate movement. If the data are generated  by a model 
in which there are real shocks connecting real rates and future output 
movements, as I suggest, this identified VAR research strategy can 
easily end up confounding  the real shocks with monetary  policy. The 
variety of real effects found in this literature,  and the tendency of real 
effects to be smaller in models estimated for countries other than the 
United States, gives me genuine concern that this may have happened. 
Let me conclude by saying again that, despite the skeptical tone of 
my comments, I find this paper  useful evidence on the effects of sys- 
tematic changes in monetary  policy that, on the whole, does weigh in 
favor of those effects being substantial.  It is quite unlikely that mone- 
tary policy could come close to eliminating the output effects of oil, 
"commodity  price," or "output" shocks, despite  the authors'  apparent 
evidence to the contrary.  This strong  conclusion rests on the their use 
of an unsustainable  policy as the counterfactual  alternative. But very 
substantial  delay or smoothing  of the  output  effects via monetary  policy, 
at the expense of more inflation, probably  would be possible. 
Benjamin M. Friedman: This paper  by Bernanke,  Gertler,  and  Watson 
is a highly useful contribution  to the empirical literature  of monetary 
policy, both for its methodological  approach  and  for some of its specific 
findings. I suspect that it, like the earlier paper by Sims and Zha on 
which it draws, will fruitfully  spur  further  research  following this kind 
of empirical strategy. Indeed, as I suggest below, this way of thinking 
about  how monetary  policy affects the economy has at least one poten- 
tial application  that may help to inform an issue of very great impor- 
tance for the practical  conduct of monetary  policy, both in the United 
States and elsewhere. 
The best way to place in context the empirical  strategy  taken  by this 
paper  is to recall the parallel distinctions, between what is systematic 
and what is unsystematic  and between what is anticipated  and what is 
unanticipated,  that  have stood  behind  much  of the literature  of monetary 
policy from the past two decades. At the theoretical  level, the argument 
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was that the only monetary  policy actions that have real effects are 
those that are unanticipated.  As is now well understood,  this proposi- 
tion rests on a variety of assumptions-for  example, perfect competi- 
tion and  perfectly  flexible wages and  prices-that  few actual  economies 
of practical  interest  satisfy. Nevertheless, because achieving analytical 
precision about the failure of those assumptions  and about the macro- 
economic consequences of that failure is highly problematic  (it is dif- 
ficult  to spell out precisely how competition  is imperfect  and  why wages 
and  prices are  sticky), the presumption  that  only unanticipated  monetary 
policy actions have real effects has continued  to underlie-sometimes 
explicitly but nowadays more often implicitly-much  of modern re- 
search in the field. Further, as the standard  assumption of rational 
expectations is usually applied, any part of the conduct of monetary 
policy that  is systematic  (for example, the central  bank's always raising 
interest  rates following a decline in unemployment  or a surge in infla- 
tion) is assumed to be anticipated, and so in this line of thinking it is 
also assumed  to be without real effects. 
At the empirical level, the parallel argument  has been that even if 
such systematic  monetary  policy actions  did affect real  economic activ- 
ity, it would be impossible to distinguish those effects from the inde- 
pendent consequences of  the events to which monetary policy was 
reacting. (For  example, to the extent  that  the central  bank  simply moves 
interest rates in response to prior observed inflation, any subsequent 
effect on real output could just as well be attributed  to the inflation 
itself as to the consequent  movement  in interest  rates.) Hence the appeal 
of the vector autoregression  approach  in this context is that it focuses 
only on those monetary  policy actions determined  to be unsystematic, 
in the sense that the VAR cannot explain them in terms of prior  move- 
ments in other variables. One danger of this approach  is that a VAR 
that includes too much information  may overexplain  the movement  of 
monetary  policy in terms of prior movements  in other variables. Such 
a VAR will erroneously  shrink  the remaining  component,  which is taken 
to be unsystematic  and therefore  also unanticipated,  to the point that it 
then appears  to have only trivial economic consequences. But the main 
point  is that  the empirical  rationale  for assessing the effects of monetary 
policy by looking only at its unsystematic  variation, which continues 
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oretical presumption  that, at least for purposes  of effects on real vari- 
ables, only unanticipated  policy actions matter. There is an inherent 
congruence  between the two lines of thinking. 
The principal  thrust  of the approach  taken  by Bernanke,  Gertler,  and 
Watson is to sever that connection by designing a way to use the em- 
pirical VAR methodology to investigate specific aspects of systematic 
monetary  policy. To be sure, the paper simply presumes, rather  than 
shows, that systematic and therefore anticipated  monetary  policy ac- 
tions can have real effects. But for readers  who accept that there are 
reasons why this may be so and who do not require  that the empirical 
model used to investigate  these effects be explicitly tied to a theoretical 
model detailing how they come about, the resulting advance is clear. 
And indeed, the authors  find  that  the specific aspect  of systematic  mon- 
etary  policy on which they choose to focus-the  central  bank's  response 
to oil price shocks and to the consequences of those shocks for prices 
and output-does  have sizable real effects. This finding is both inter- 
esting and important.  (To be clear, the within  month  response  of mon- 
etary policy to an oil price shock would be unanticipated  and therefore 
presumed  to have real effects, even in a Lucas-style model. Although 
the paper is not specific on this distinction, I assume that the bulk of 
the real  effects that  the authors  attribute  to the monetary  policy response 
to oil price shocks results  from movement  in the policy variable  occur- 
ring after the month  in which the oil price moves.) 
As indicated at the outset, I suspect that this methodology has an 
immediate  application  of potentially  great importance.  A question that 
has rightly attracted  widespread  attention, among industrial  as well as 
developing countries, is how price inflation  affects a country's ability 
to maintain  real economic growth. Evidence shows that above some 
modest level (the high single-digit range), inflation does reduce the 
average pace of real growth over time. A familiar view, however, is 
that inflation negatively affects real growth not because inflation, per 
se, matters  in this context, but because the central bank acts to resist 
inflation;  and in a world in which the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace  assump- 
tions do not obtain, it can only do so by slowing ("sacrificing") real 
output. The methodology used in this paper seems potentially able to 
address  this question too. If so, the findings would be very valuable. 
Although both the methodology  and the findings of Bernanke, 
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give cause for reservation.  First, as they are at some pains to emphasize, 
there  is  substantial  evidence  of  instability  in their results  across  the 
three decades of their sample.  In particular, as figure 10 clearly shows, 
the "systematic"  response of monetary policy to oil price shocks in the 
Volcker  period was far greater than either earlier or later. 
A  question  that this  instability  immediately  raises  is  whether  it is 
reasonable to view the more energetic anti-inflationary monetary policy 
of  the Volcker  era exclusively  as a response  to an oil  price  shock.  I 
believe  that the Federal Reserve  System under Paul Volcker  adopted a 
policy  broadly aimed at reducing the U.S.  inflation rate, and that the 
rise in oil prices in 1979 and 1980 was only one element in the inflation 
process  against which  it directed its policy.  The results plotted in the 
middle right-hand panel in figure 6, showing that the simulated response 
to the historical oil shock accounts for only a small part of the increase 
in the federal funds rate during 1981-82,  are certainly consistent  with 
this view.  Because  of the post  hoc ergo propter hoc character of VAR 
analysis,  the Bernanke-Gertler-Watson  paper may attribute to the spe- 
cific  response  (here and in other subperiods) of monetary policy  to oil 
price shocks  what was actually the more general conduct of monetary 
policy,  based on other considerations. 
The findings of subsample instability  also highlight the difficulty  of 
identifying  what  "systematic"  policy  means  in  the  first place.  For 
purely empirical purposes of extracting impulse responses and variance 
decomparisons  from past data, systematic  simply means whatever hap- 
pened on average across the arbitrarily chosen sample under study. But 
as is the case in this paper, researchers often seek to connect this purely 
empirical  notion  of  systematic  behavior  with  the  concept  of  policy 
"rules,"  so as to go on to draw inferences  about the consequences  of 
the central bank following  one rule rather than another. As  a number 
of people  (Sims,  John Taylor,  and I, among many others) have argued 
in one  context  or another,  it is not clear that in practical settings  the 
central bank is ever following  a rule,  in the crucial dual sense  that its 
actions are not only systematic but also perceived to be so and therefore 
properly anticipated by the relevant public. The fact that estimating the 
authors' VAR over the 1976-85  sample delivers  the federal funds rate 
response  shown  in the right-hand panel  of  the third row  in figure  10 
does not necessarily  make this response a characterization of systematic 
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A second set of reservations stems from the authors' use of oil price 
shocks  as the principal empirical  vehicle  for their study of  systematic 
monetary policy.  To put it bluntly,  does the Hamilton idea really make 
sense?  For example,  should one really think of the  1957-58  recession 
in  the  United  States  as  a ripple  from  the  1956  Suez  affair? To  take 
Hamilton's  idea seriously  would require a major rethinking of most of 
post-World  War II U.S.  business cycle  history-which  clearly has not 
happened  in the decade  and a half  since  Hamilton's  intriguing  paper 
appeared. The authors of the present paper are perhaps more secure in 
that the role  of  oil  prices  is  more plausible  in at least  two,  possibly 
three,  of  the  five  recessions  covered  in  their  sample,  which  mostly 
postdates Hamilton's.  Even so,  I suspect that their difficulty in finding 
a measure of oil  price shocks that satisfactorily  fits the oil facts to the 
macroeconomic  data is a warning of just this problem. 
Finally,  several  aspects  of  the  authors'  treatment of  interest  rates 
also bear closer attention. The assumption that interest rate movements 
are a  sufficient  statistic  for  the  channels  by  which  monetary  policy 
affects  macroeconomic  activity  is,  by itself,  not unusual.  Indeed,  the 
authors may well overemphasize  its limitations.  Costs of financing (in- 
cluding  opportunity  costs)  are an important factor  in  many kinds  of 
spending  decisions,  and for this purpose interest rate fluctuations may 
also  plausibly  stand in for  at least  part of  the relevant  movement  in 
either exchange  rates or broader asset prices. While the strong rejection 
of the restriction excluding  the federal funds rate from the output equa- 
tion is somewhat surprising, the authors are presumably correct that the 
practical effects  of imposing this restriction are small.  Further, it is my 
conjecture  that if  a stock  price  index  were  included  in the VAR,  the 
data would  accept this restriction.  (Because  the analysis  in this paper 
depends  so crucially  on the role of short- and long-term interest rates, 
however,  there  is  probably  much  to  be  learned  from  examining  the 
coefficients  of these interest rates in the output equation,  as well  as the 
impulse responses relating output to the independent components of the 
two interest rates. It would therefore be useful to show explicitly  these 
key elements  of the analysis.) 
The potential  problem,  however,  is the strong implied  rejection  of 
the expectations  hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, which 
the authors use as the organizing  principle for this part of their model. 
Normally,  within this framework, the "term premium" included in any Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson  153 
specific  interest rate is a substantive reflection of borrowers' and lend- 
ers'  attitudes toward such features as the risk and liquidity  of the un- 
derlying  debt instrument. But in this paper, the term premium simply 
serves  to undo the behavior  that the built-in  expectations  hypothesis 
implies  that interest rates should be following  (see,  for example,  fig- 
ure 3). Moreover,  the results plotted in figure 4 for prices and the long- 
term rate are dramatically  at variance  with  standard notions  of  how 
inflation expectations  affect nominal interest rates. In this experiment, 
not surprisingly,  moving  from the base simulation  to either the Sims- 
Zha simulation or the anticipated policy  simulation results in far higher 
prices and hence much greater inflation. But in the Sims-Zha simulation 
the  long-term  interest  rate  is  uniformly  below  its  level  in  the  base 
simulation,  and in the  anticipated  policy  simulation  it even  declines 
absolutely.  So much for the notion that investors  rationally anticipate 
the consequences  of monetary policy for future inflation and incorporate 
the resulting  inflation expectations  into current bond prices! 
These  three  sets  of  reservations  notwithstanding,  I  applaud  the 
broader methodological  direction taken by Bernanke, Gertler, and Wat- 
son and retain my sense  that their finding of quantitatively  significant 
effects  from systematic  monetary policy  is both correct and important. 
General  discussion:  Participants generally  accepted the authors' con- 
clusion  that the output declines  following  oil  price  shocks  had come 
mainly  from the responses  of  monetary policy  to the shocks.  Several 
also discussed  the plausible magnitude of oil shock effects  themselves. 
One  issue  was  how  much  an oil  price  increase,  or a decrease  in oil 
supply,  should  affect  potential output; a second  was whether oil price 
increases reduce demand and lead to lower levels  of utilization  of pro- 
ductive  capacity.  Robert Hall observed  that, for infinitesimal  changes 
in oil  prices,  the ability of the United  States to produce should not be 
impaired by  a rise  in the price of  imported oil,  even  if it reduces  oil 
use; the derivative  of real GDP with respect to the price of oil  is zero 
no matter how large the adjustment, with Division  GDP.  However,  he 
and William  Nordhaus agreed there could be effects  on potential GDP 
as the equilibrium supply of domestic  factors adjusted to the change in 
oil prices. George Perry added that some estimates from earlier studies, 
such as a reduction of several percentage points of GDP from OPEC 1, 
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into account the effect of an oil price increase on aggregate demand, where 
the price increase could  be  analyzed approximately like  an increase in 
excise taxes with high-saving foreigners getting the revenue, a large short- 
run impact on GDP was believable.  He added that the allocation of such 
an impact between a "fiscal"  and a monetary effect would depend, some- 
what arbitrarily, on how baseline monetary policy was defined. 
Nordhaus raised several issues  about the appropriateness of the var- 
ious  measures  of  oil  shocks  used  by  the  authors.  He  suggested  that 
almost  any  theory,  whether  Perry's  that the  short-run impact  of  in- 
creases  could  be regarded as a tax paid to foreigners  or Sims's  that it 
should be treated simply  as an increase  in input prices,  should lead to 
some  measure involving  oil purchases relative to the size  of the econ- 
omy.  This scaling  makes an enormous difference.  For the last three oil 
shocks in the sample,  he calculated the increased costs of imported oil, 
with quantities fixed,  were  1.8 percent of GDP in 1973,  1.0 percent of 
GDP  in  1979,  and 0.2  percent of  GDP  in  1990.  Using  this  measure 
would preserve the peaks of the Hamilton series,  but the shocks would 
be progressively  smaller.  Nordhaus also  noted that the paper ignores 
the negative  oil shock of  1986,  when the price decline  corresponded to 
a negative shock of 0.5  percent of GDP.  He reasoned that the failure to 
scale the shocks,  along with the fact that the positive shocks of  1986 and 
1990 were quickly reversed, may explain why the responses in the two 
subperiods look  so  different in the authors' analysis.  William Brainard 
agreed with Nordhaus's argument for scaling the shocks and added that it 
might be useful to construct a similar measure indicating the magnitude 
of the redistribution between domestic producers and consumers. 
Robert Shiller observed that the stochastic  properties of the oil price 
series  seemed  to  have  changed  after the  Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting Countries broke up in 1986.  Before that, the oil price was a 
series  of plateaus separated by sudden jumps,  so that changes  seem to 
have a lot of information. But afterward, the oil price looks like a mean- 
reverting process,  so the movements have less information. He reasoned 
that the public  may realize  this difference,  which  would  explain  why 
oil price changes  are no longer big news.  Reflecting  on the widespread 
concerns  about oil  in the  1970s  and 1980s,  Shiller  suggested  that the 
long  view  is important in economics  and the best way to deal with an 
anomaly is to wait it out until it disappears. He suggested that may have 
happened with oil. Ben S. Bernanke,  Mark Gertler, and Mark Watson  155 
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